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ABSTRACT
One of the earliest steps in civil litigation is the “motion to dismiss.” Dismissal offers the opportunity to
preemptively dispose of a given claim that does not present a legally judiciable case or controversy prior to expending
time or energy on matters like discovery or a trial. Everyday talk, of course, is not bound by such procedural rules.
Yet in normal conversations we often engage in a form of discursive dismissal. When faced with discomforting
claims our instinct is not to engage in reasoned deliberation over them. Instead, we frequently brush them aside
without considering their merits. By delegitimizing the claim as entirely unworthy of substantive public
deliberation, we need not reason over it. Yet despite being a ubiquitous part of everyday conversation, this broader
understanding of dismissal has not been independently identified or assessed.
Focusing on the discursive form of dismissal yields important insights into how we analyze (or fail to analyze)
difficult claims—something that occurs across all deliberative forums. In this way, dismissal is not the sole or
even primary province of the courts. But courts do possess one characteristic that makes them worth assessing
independently: they are a site where—some of the time—deliberators have to listen. This places them on very
different terrain than politicians, pundits, or everyday citizens, all of whom are relatively free to brush aside
discomforting claims at their discretion. Courts may play an important role in protecting unpopular groups not
because judges are wiser, less prejudiced, or more insulated from democratic pressures, but simply because courts
offer a space where—some of the time—arguments must be heard and reasons must be given.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2004, Javad Iqbal filed suit against the United States government.
His allegations were grave. One of thousands of persons picked up for
questioning after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Iqbal alleged that he was
subjected to continuous abuse while detained awaiting trial, abuse that
stemmed directly from his racial and religious background. More
importantly, Iqbal’s complaint did not attribute this treatment to a few
overzealous low-level field agents. He made a far more explosive allegation:
that the decision to designate him and other Muslim detainees “high interest”
was part of an official government policy approved at the highest levels of the
American government. Among the persons Iqbal claimed were involved in
the decision were Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert
Mueller.
We never did find out whether Iqbal’s allegations were true. The
Supreme Court ultimately dismissed his case in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,1 a case that
“revolutionized” pleading standards in federal court.2 Because the case was
dismissed, it never proceeded to discovery, and so neither judges nor the
public ever got the opportunity to examine or evaluate the record regarding
treatment of Muslim prisoners in the aftermath of the attacks on September
11, 2001. It is possible that none of the misconduct Iqbal alleged occurred,
and it is possible that if it did happen it was entirely unattributable to upperlevel governmental policy. But the only fact we know is that we do not
actually know one way or the other.
Dismissal, put in an abstract form, is a mechanism for disposing of claims
without going through a full and complete investigation. And while
formalized and codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the act of
dismissal can be seen in any deliberative forum where people attempt to
register arguments. Whether we are inside the courtroom or standing in the
public square, we necessarily face choices about whether and how to respond
to claims put before us. Taken broadly, dismissal is one such response—or
perhaps more aptly, non-response. As a discursive practice, we dismiss a
proffered claim when we decide to dispense with it prior to considering its
merits.
Whether in its legal or discursive form, the act of dismissal matters. On
the one hand, no deliberative forum can guarantee that every claim is heard
1
2

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1337
(2010). Another case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), is generally given
revolutionary co-credit.
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and every argument is considered. There are limits to what even diligent
deliberators can reasonably take up. But at the same time, any functional
system of social deliberation—from formal judicial processes to everyday
discussion—presumes that participants will consider the merits of the case
put before them and so, potentially, revise even passionately held beliefs. Yet
people are very adept at finding reasons not to engage in this consideration
precisely because it runs the risk of forcing such a reassessment. The
arguments that most demand public engagement may well be the least likely
to successfully get and keep our attention.
The potential wrong associated with dismissal, in short, is not that
deliberative resources are scarce. It is that they are maldistributed. Instead
of substantively engaging difficult questions, threatening claims will be cast
as inherently implausible, made in bad faith, or outside the bounds of
civilized discussion—all potential reasons why one should not have to devote
time and attention to actually considering them. These claims are, in a word,
dismissed.
Understood in this way, dismissal is certainly not limited to the courts.
Yet courts do provide an interesting comparative lens on the matter, because
they possess one very unusual characteristic: they are a location where
decision-makers frequently have to consider whatever claims come before them.
While there are certainly many arguments courts cannot consider, there are
also many circumstances where courts must consider arguments that the
judges would rather ignore—they must grant a hearing, they must provide
reasons. This is markedly different from non-legal settings, where there is
rarely anything compelling us to consider upsetting or discomforting
allegations “on their merits”—even in a biased or motivated manner. The
comparative advantage of the judiciary—that it sometimes has to listen—offers
a significant, yet often underappreciated, deliberative and epistemic virtue.
Courts may play an important role in protecting unpopular groups not
because judges are wiser, less prejudiced, or more insulated from democratic
pressures, but simply because courts offer a space where—some of the time—
arguments must be heard.
Part I of this Article outlines the concept of dismissal as both a legal and
social practice. As a legal principle, the dismissal sets out rules for when courts
can (or must) not evaluate a claim put before them. At the outset, this places
courts in a unique deliberative position. Other deliberators in the public
square—whether they be legislators, newspaper editors, or simply everyday
private citizens—face virtually no restrictions one way or the other regarding
what arguments they must or must not consider. Unlike judges, they are
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generally free to consider any sort of argument they like. Also, unlike judges,
they are generally free to not engage with any argument they find distasteful.
That judges—sometimes—are not just permitted but compelled to listen
is a critical and underappreciated institutional niche occupied by the
judiciary, not just compared to other political branches but over other modes
of public deliberation. If, as seems likely, the sorts of claims deliberators
would rather not consider are asymmetrically distributed—most likely to
emanate from marginalized, unpopular, or minority claimants—then the
judiciary may be the only forum that will genuinely consider them if only
because it is the only forum where someone might be compelled to consider
them. Yet if this is the unique deliberative virtue of the judiciary, then there
is even more reason to worry about doctrinal trends (embodied in Iqbal)
giving judges more discretion to dismiss cases. These trends erode the
judiciary’s comparative deliberative advantage and significantly impair the
unique capacity courts possess to foster democratic conversations that might
otherwise remain marginalized.
When functioning properly, judges are more likely than other
deliberative actors to have to consider uncomfortable or challenging
claims—ones which strike at the heart of their political, cultural, or
ideological priors. But what in the abstract seems like a deliberative
advantage for the judiciary also functions as a cognitive threat. Hence, Part I
explores the concept of dismissal as part of a trio of “cognitive checkpoints”
we use to avoid discomforting or inhospitable conclusions. The literature on
motivated cognition has strongly challenged the naïve view the persons have
an unmediated preference for ‘truth’ or generally appraise evidence in an
unbiased fashion. Rather, persons have preferences about the beliefs they
hold, and seek to preserve these views against external challenge. To this
end they have several weapons in their arsenal. Much of the motivatedcognition research focuses on one particular method: how people make
biased evaluations of evidence and arguments that challenge their desired
worldview. But this is only part of the story. While this form of ‘evaluative’
motivated reasoning typically envisions a person who actually is grappling
with the substance of an uncongenial argument (albeit in a biased fashion),
often persons would prefer to sidestep that cognitively taxing process.
People can also evade reckoning with uncomfortable arguments by
remaining ignorant of them—that is, putting themselves in a position where
they are unlikely to encounter the claims in the first place. And even if they
do come across a challenging claim, they can still dismiss it—they can use a
variety of justifications to shunt the claim aside prior to engaging with it on
its merits. Evaluative motivated reasoning is in reality often the move of last
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resort—it is employed when an actor has not succeeded in avoiding
encountering the claim in the first place and has for one reason or another
been forced to engage with it substantively.
Dismissal can thus very effectively insulate cherished beliefs from
reconsideration. But, as Part II explores, it also often comes attached to
unique and pernicious dignitary harms imposed upon the dismissed speaker.
As a social practice, dismissal can be seen as an element of what Miranda
Fricker calls “epistemic injustice”—wronging someone in their “capacity as
a knower.”3 Fricker’s work, influential in philosophy but virtually unknown
in law, concerns how we interact with one another as possessors and
transmitters of knowledge. An epistemic injustice denies or demeans this
essential human capacity.
Dismissal very often represents such a
degradation: it suggests that the claim—or claimant—is so implausible or
insignificant that we need not spend any time considering it seriously.
Part III offers the practice of dismissing discrimination as a keynote
example of the concept. In the social sphere, discrimination claims are often
dismissed—“you’re playing the race card” is perhaps the most well-known
iteration of the phenomenon—and this makes for a compelling illustration
of the broader concept. At its simplest, dismissing discrimination claims is
justified by the presumption that such claims are routinely leveled in bad
faith and therefore need not be taken seriously. In more sophisticated guise,
discrimination claims are dismissed as facially implausible by reference to
deeply ingrained understandings regarding the meaning of discrimination
and what facts we are willing to infer from the instances of conduct that
typically prompt discrimination claims. Even as it relies upon these
understandings and inferences, the act of dismissing discrimination
simultaneously insulates them from challenge since the decision to dismiss is
by definition a decision to refrain from further engagement on the subject.
Any inadequacies or shortcomings in dominant or personal understandings
of discrimination can be ignored indefinitely, as the very process which would
allow them to be revealed is short-circuited by the ability to dismiss the
critique out of hand.
Part IV concludes by reassessing the legal standing of dismissal as part of
this wider discursive practice. This approach is a comparative institutionalist
one,4 although here the institutions to be compared are not just the other
3
4

Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing 20 (2007).
See Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 366 (1984) (urging that law pay attention to “the relative strengths and
weaknesses” of the different branches of government in determining how to allocate decisionmaking authority (emphasis added)).
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branches of government but all social locations where we engage in public
deliberation. Many have been skeptical of the judiciary’s status as a
deliberative forum because law can never represent more than a narrow
subset of potential public claims of justice or injustice.5 Arguments and
claims—however justified or important they may be—which do not cohere
to an extant and cognizable legal claim cannot be recognized in court.
This is all true. But there is more to the story. While legal claims are
indeed limited, in the right circumstances they also can provide defined ways
of pushing conversations forward. Nobody can force the newspaper to
publish your column, or a senator to meet with your interest group, or a
congressional committee to hold a hearing on your bill. But courts are
different. Law occupies a virtually unique deliberative niche in that certain
claims must be heard—even if they are uncomfortable, even if the relevant
decision-makers would rather ignore them. And so, in considering why
certain outgroups have often seemed attracted to litigation-centric strategies
for social reform, the impetus may not be that judges are necessarily smarter,
or kinder, or even more counter-majoritarian. The attraction of courts might
simply lie in the fact that law can provide a cognitive expressway, taking
certain types of claims that everyday deliberators would prefer to shunt aside
and ensuring that they get some form of consideration. It does not do so
perfectly, of course; and even when it does offer consideration, it provides no
guarantee of victory. But just being in the space of reasons can be a
significant advance for groups or claims accustomed to being dismissed out
of hand.
I. DISMISSAL, IN AND OUT OF THE COURTS
A. Law as a Vector of Social Conversation
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) gives defendants in a civil action
the opportunity to dismiss a filed claim. There are several bases for doing so:
the court might lack jurisdiction (personal or subject-matter), it might be the
improper venue, or the claim might not “plausibly” be of the sort upon which
the court can grant relief.6 The motion to dismiss, in turn, is a critical gate
in the litigation process because it precedes discovery.7 Much of the hard,

5
6
7

See infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (establishing the “plausibility” requirement for
pleadings); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (characterizing pleading rules as “unlock[ing] the doors of discovery”).
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taxing, and expensive work of figuring out ‘what happened’ can be avoided
if the court can decline to hear the case at its inception.
But what is “dismissal” as a concept? In its most abstract formulation, to
dismiss an argument is to decline to consider it prior to substantive
investigation.8 This is the function of the motion to dismiss inside the
courtroom. When a court dismisses a case due to lack of jurisdiction,9 or
improper venue,10 or defects in the service of process,11 it is not issuing a
judgment on the merits of the filed claim itself—it is explaining why it need
not or cannot issue such a judgment. Even dismissal for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted”12 does not necessarily render an
ultimate decision on the substantive validity or invalidity of the claim—
rather, it represents a declaration that the claim is not of the sort that is within
the judicial province to address.
The question “dismissal” seeks to answer is whether and when a
deliberator—in the judicial context, a court—must actually reason through
a proffered complaint on its merits. The motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)
offers an opportunity to preemptively dispose of a filed claim prior to
engaging in discovery. At this stage in litigation the plaintiff has only
provided a pleading which contains “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”;13 the question is what a plaintiff
must include in this pleading in order to survive the dismissal motion.
Under this understanding, dismissal illuminates an important feature of
the American judiciary. By formalizing the circumstances where courts
cannot hear or consider a claim that is presented before them, the concept

8

9
10
11
12
13

There are, of course, several notable differences between dismissal in civil procedure and ‘dismissal’
in private conversation. For example, while a Rule 12 dismissal sometimes evades the merits of the
dispute entirely (as in a standing or jurisdictional challenge), in other cases the only salient dispute
is over the contours of the law and so a decision to dismiss may entail significant and searching
consideration of the merits. In other circumstances, where the implausibility is primarily factual
rather than legal, courts avoid further inquiry via summary judgment under Rule 56. See Makaeff
v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (describing Rule
12 and Rule 56 as an “integrated program” for determining whether to dispense with federal claims
prior to a trial).
Of course, private deliberation does not distinguish between ‘law’ (or principle) and ‘fact’, so there
is no analogue for the procedural differences between Rules 12 and 56. And a dismissal on standing
or jurisdiction is sometimes a closer analogue to my usage than is a 12(b)(6) dismissal. These
inconsistencies hopefully do not distract from the clear parallels between dismissal as a civil
procedure concept and dismissal as a practice in non-legal discourse.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(2).
Id. 12(b)(3).
Id. 12(b)(4)–(5).
Id. 12(b)(6).
Id. 8(a)(2).
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of dismissal also establishes that, if a claim does meet the criteria that make
it into a justiciable case or controversy, then the parties are entitled to their
day in court.14 A claim which survives a motion to dismiss is a claim which,
at some level, must be heard. This quality of the courts—their status as a
place where decisionmakers have to listen—was recognized from America’s
earliest days. In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed:
It is the essence of judicial power . . . not to come of itself to the assistance of
those who are oppressed, but to be constantly at the disposition of the most
humble among them. However weak one supposes him, he can always force the judge
to listen to his complaint and to respond to it: that is due to the very constitution of
judicial power.15

And one hundred years later, Charles Hamilton Houston explained the
NAACP’s litigation-centric strategy in pursuit of African-American civil
rights in similar terms: “[W]e use the courts as a medium of public
discussion,” he said, “since it is the one place where we can force America to
listen.”16
The judiciary is not always thought of in these terms. There is ample
reason to be skeptical of the ability of judges to provide any unique
deliberative insight beyond what is already present in the broader
population.17 Judges, after all, “come from society and thus are likely to
harbor prejudices similar to those held in society at large (or at least society’s
elite).”18 Consequently, it is far from clear why they should be expected to
possess any particular deliberative advantage unmatched by other, nonjudicial actors. For their part, judges insist on reminding the public that the
role of the judiciary is not to “right every wrong, suture every societal wound,

14

15
16
17

18

See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (“Our
cases have long supported the proposition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the
exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (“We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which
is not given.”).
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 668 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop, eds. & trans., 2000) (1840) (emphasis added).
Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925–1950, at 18
(1987).
See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 949 (2011) (presenting these
reasons, among others, for why many scholars believe that courts are “constrained” and litigation
is an “empty promise” for social reform movements); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
David Schraub, Unsuspecting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 361, 410 (2016); see also David Schraub, Comment,
The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and Judicial Protection in the Gay Rights Movement, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1437, 1463 (2010) (“Where there is no social support for protecting a given minority, it is
unclear why judges, who are part of that same society, should be expected to consistently rise above
the prejudices of their times.”).
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and correct every injustice.”19 And even where there is a valid role for the
judiciary to play in addressing a given social problem, judges can nonetheless
only select from a narrow range of possible interventions—large swaths of
potentially productive or useful remedies remain outside of their purview.20
Compared to the legislative branch (much less informal efforts at popular
persuasion), the judiciary is by design a narrow and constrained body—one
that can only redress claims through the very narrow prism afforded by
established legal precedent. Many claims—even very important, very
justified claims—cannot be legitimately made in the argot of the law. For
this reason legal forums are often asserted to be “especially problematic”
arenas for the deliberative project because of “the restrictions they impose
upon admissible argument and so free dialogue.”21
These arguments are not wrong. But they are incomplete. It is true that
courts are in an important respect less ‘open’ to claims than are, say,
newspapers or legislators. Newspapers can publish whatever they want,
there is no ‘jurisdictional’ bar that they need to account for first. Likewise,
legislators are largely free to focus their attention on any cause or interest
group that strikes their fancy; they are not limited in their ability to conduct
hearings in the same way that a court is.22 And of course, private
conversation is open to any topic or debate that holds participants’ interests.
But in another respect, courts possess an important advantage over other
deliberative institutions. Nobody can force the newspaper to publish your
column, or a senator to meet with your interest group, or a congressional
committee to hold a hearing on your bill. The same freedom that allows
them to listen to everything equally grants them the right to ignore anything.
Indeed, this entitlement is central to the very idea of private deliberative
freedom. Jürgen Habermas observes:
Private autonomy extends as far as the legal subject does not have to give
others an account or give publicly acceptable reasons for her action plans.
Legally granted liberties entitle one to drop out of communicative action, to
refuse illocutionary obligations; they ground a privacy freed from the burden

19
20

21
22

Gerald E. Rosen, The Hard Part of Judging, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000).
See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052–57 (1978) (discussing the limited ways
in which courts can truly address racial inequality in America given law’s understanding of racial
discrimination through the lens of discrete perpetrators).
John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations 71 (2000).
Cf. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 83–88 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1980)
(1690) (discussing the “prerogative” powers of government).
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of reciprocally acknowledged and mutually expected communicative
freedoms.23

But judges are not free in this way. As Chief Justice Marshall observed
in Cohens v. Virginia:
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it
approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it
is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be
attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we
cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and
conscientiously to perform our duty. 24

Just as judges are limited in what they can hear, so too are they limited
in what they can decline to hear. The rules of judicial dismissal (indeed, the
basic fact that, unlike its private or legislative counterparts, judicial dismissal
is bound by rules at all) can act to force consideration of certain claims that
would otherwise go unheard. Law occupies a virtually unique deliberative
niche in that certain claims must be heard—even if they are uncomfortable,
even if the relevant decision-makers would rather ignore them.
The mere fact that—sometimes—judges have to listen is a critical and
underappreciated institutional advantage of the judiciary, not just over the
other political branches but over other modes of deliberation. An important
part of political freedom is the ability to argue, before the relevant
institutions, that one is being treated unfairly. Even in a just society “bad
things happen: people get assaulted, mugged, sacked without due reason and
so on. But what is crucial . . . is the victim’s ability to contest the wrongful
treatment.”25 If the “relevant institutional body” (the police, the courts, the
grievance committee, etc.) does not hear—or does not fairly and impartially

23
24
25

Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to A Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy 120 (1996).
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
Miranda Fricker, Silence and Institutional Prejudice, in OUT FROM THE SHADOWS: ANALYTICAL
FEMINIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY 287, 301 (Sharon L. Crasnow &
Anita M. Superson eds., 2012); see also PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT 186–87 (1997) (articulating the basic features of “contestation” as an essential
attribute of republican freedom); Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, The Easy Core Case for Judicial Review,
2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 227, 238–39 (2010) (articulating the contours of the “right to a hearing”
consisting of “the opportunity to voice a grievance, the opportunity to be provided with a
justification for a decision that impinges (or may impinge) on one’s rights, and the duty to reconsider
the initial decision giving rise to the grievance”).
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consider—the complaint, then this essential element of political freedom is
lacking.26
When political or social deliberation functions properly, it offers a forum
wherein people feel confident that the wrongs they experience will be
carefully considered and reasonably redressed. This does not mean that
claimants must always have their claims ultimately vindicated, but it does
mean that they will be taken under consideration. To be sure, nobody can
give full consideration to every potential claim or controversy. Deliberative
resources are scarce; triaging is inevitable. But it is equally clear that these
distributional decisions are fraught with danger. When given the
opportunity to choose, deliberators will predictably focus their attention on
those claims and claimants least likely to disturb or unsettle their deep-felt
social or ideological priors.
Because courts offer a space where this discretion is constrained, they are
uniquely advantaged vis-à-vis other deliberative institutions to offer a forum
where even unpopular ideas or arguments can gain a hearing.27 Put another
way, what makes the judiciary different from other deliberative bodies—and
potentially more open to claims of socially marginalized groups—is not that
judges are especially educated, empathic, or even sensible people. Rather, it
is that unlike the rest of us judges by and large do not have boundless
discretion to refuse to hear claims that are facially disconcerting.
To be clear, the deliberative advantage asserted here is comparative, not
absolute. Well before Iqbal, courts have had the capacity to dodge hearing
cases they would rather not address on their merits.28 Yet it remains the case
that courts possess an underappreciated, peculiarly democratic function in
our governmental and social system. Limited though it may be, the legal
system still “provides a uniquely democratic . . . mechanism for individual

26
27
28

Fricker, supra note 25, at 301.
See Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 991, 999 (2006)
(identifying the “right to a hearing” as the core justification for judicial review).
See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1961)
(identifying judicial doctrines, such as standing, mootness, and jurisdiction, which assist in
managing “the timing and limits of the judicial function”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374, 424–31 (1982) (noting the risks of the increasing “managerial” role judges have
taken over the cases they hear).
A widely recognized recent case of this sort of behavior came in 2004, when the Supreme Court
utilized the doctrine of “prudential standing” to overturn a 9th Circuit opinion striking down the
inclusion of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance without addressing the issue on its merits. Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004). See generally Eileen Braman,
Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences in Legal Decision Making, 68 J. POL. 308
(2006).
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citizens to invoke public authority on their own and for their benefit.”29 The
average citizen cannot get an audience with the President or a meeting with
their senator; they are not guaranteed a voice in the pundit box or a space in
the editorial section. But every citizen has the right to walk into court and in
some form receive an audience and response from an official representative
of the United States government. In a world where certain types of claims
and certain types of claimants are routinely and preemptively dismissed
without serious engagement, that has equalizing power.
Unfortunately, a focus on the unique deliberative virtues of the judiciary
also puts a worrisome gloss on recent judicial trends giving judges increased
discretion to dismiss cases. These trends erode the judiciary’s comparative
deliberative advantage and significantly impair the unique potential courts
possess to foster democratic conversations that might otherwise remain
marginalized.
B. “Twiqbal” and the Problem of Plausibility Pleading
For many years, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rules
surrounding dismissal buttressed this unique deliberative function. In 1957,
the Court in Conley v. Gibson stated that “a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.”30 This “no set of facts” standard was the legal rule for the next fifty
years, and generally maximized the ability of litigants to gain a hearing by
dramatically limiting judges’ discretion to preemptively declare a claim
unsuitable for judicial resolution.
Then, in the late 2000s, a pair of decisions—Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly31
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal32—dramatically changed the terrain. These cases
tightened the pleading rules to require that plaintiffs set out allegations which
“plausibly” support a legal violation.33 “Plausible,” the Court held, was less
than “probable,” but nonetheless demands “more than a sheer possibility

29
30
31
32
33

Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System,
77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 690, 692 (1983).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)
that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”).
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that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”34 More specifically, the Court
expressly held that simply asserting facts “consistent” with a legal violation
would not suffice to establish a “plausible” case.35 This repudiation of the
“no set of facts” test triggered a wave of commentary regarding the “Twiqbal”
duo and its implications for civil pleading.36 One common complaint was
that the cases created a Catch-22: Plaintiffs “cannot state a claim because
they do not have access to documents or witnesses they believe exist; and
they cannot get access to those documents or witnesses without stating a
claim.”37 Others have protested that the process by which the Supreme
Court altered the pleading rules was defective, leading to uncertainty and
increased transactional costs.38
One particular concern about Twiqbal, however, stands out: the claim
that it allows judges to dispense with claims based on little more than whether
they “ring true.”39 While the relative lack of discretion courts had over when
to hear claims placed them in a markedly different deliberative position from
other social actors, the plausibility-pleading standard injected significant
subjectivity into the dismissal decision that was largely absent under the prior
notice-pleading rule.40 In Iqbal, the Court conceded that “[d]etermining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.”41 But judicial “common sense” regarding

34
35
36

37
38

39
40

41

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565–67.
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217 (2010); Kevin M.
Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010);
Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery?: Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012); see also David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99
GEO. L.J. 117, 120–21 (2010) (collecting and summarizing common reactions to the cases).
Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62
STAN. L. REV. 905, 927 (2010).
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 36, at 847 (“We regret the Court’s move [in Iqbal]— . . . not
because we are certain that we lived under the ideal pleading regime, but because we are certain
that a design change of this magnitude should occur only after a thorough airing of the choices.”).
Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 153, 262 (2009) (quoting Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead
to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A10).
See Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism: A New Means to Measure Civil Procedure, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 187, 201 (2013) (“[U]nlike notice pleading, plausibility pleading is a highly
subjective and ambiguous standard, which may allow implicit bias to operate against minoritygroup members.”).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citation omitted).
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what inferences are reasonable or plausible does not necessarily represent the
only conclusion that a rational citizen might arrive at.42
Judges are vulnerable to the same biases as the rest of us; they are just as
likely to prefer to not consider cases that carry a risk of leading to
uncomfortable, disturbing, or otherwise distressing outcomes. Several
empirical projects have accordingly sought to quantify whether the new
pleading requirements had measurably adverse effects on plaintiffs’ prospects
for success.43 Discrimination claims, for example, have been particularly
vulnerable to increased rates of dismissal under the Iqbal “plausibility”
regime—and as will be argued below, it is not surprising that they would fare
particularly poorly as judges are given more discretion to avoid discomforting
thoughts.44
Indeed, if the worry is that plausibility-pleading is a vector through which
courts can dismiss claims that might prove especially unsettling or
discomforting, it is quite possible (or should we say plausible?) that Iqbal itself
is an example of the problem. The allegations in Iqbal were explosive: Iqbal
claimed that following the September 11th attacks he and thousands of
Muslim men were targeted for arrest and harsh confinement conditions
solely on the basis of religion, race, and national origin.45 These orders, the
complaint alleged, came from top officials including Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller.46 The Court dismissed the case,
concluding that the pleadings were insufficient with respect to these highlevel officials. The Court conceded that the pleadings did allege conduct that
was “consistent with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees ‘of high
interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin,” which would have
satisfied the Conley standard.47 “But,” the Court continued, “given more
likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.”48 These
other explanations were that any disparate impact on Muslim men stemmed
42

43

44

45
46
47
48

See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott
v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009) (finding that several
significant subcommunities interpreted the facts of Scott v. Harris in a manner that the Supreme
Court concluded would be unreasonable).
See, e.g., Gelbach, supra note 36, at 2276–77 (discussing multiple approaches to analyzing the effects
of switching to the Twombly/Iqbal standard); Quintanilla, supra note 40, at 196 (citing studies
showing that the new pleading standard has increased the dismissal rate for civil rights claims).
See Quintanilla, supra note 40, at 206 (“[F]ederal district courts have increased the dismissal rate for
Black plaintiffs’ claims of race-based employment discrimination in ambiguous cases.”); infra Part
III.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669.
Id.
Id. at 681.
Id.
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from the Muslim background of the September 11th hijackers, and that
harsh confinement conditions likewise stemmed not from their national
origin or religion but rather their status as suspected terrorists.49
The allegation in Iqbal—that in the wake of September 11 there was a
widespread and official policy, dictated from the highest levels of
government, to illegally target and indefinitely confine Muslim men in
restrictive “supermax” conditions—is perhaps the paradigmatic example of
a discomforting thought. Persons willing to concede that “a few bad apples”
may have engaged in illegal discrimination following the World Trade
Center attacks may still nonetheless be uncomfortable with the possibility
that this was official Justice Department policy.50 And of course, it is possible
that investigation and discovery would confirm that there was no such policy
and that any illegal conduct really was exceptional. But of course, it is also
possible that discovery would find the opposite. The substantive result of
Iqbal was that the judicial system managed to avoid finding out either way—
and thus guarantee it would never have to grapple with the implications if
Iqbal’s claims were, in fact, borne out.
That Iqbal has this effect is neither coincidental nor idiosyncratic. It fits
well inside models of motivated cognition, wherein people—judges included—
want to believe what they want to believe. Normally, this proceeds via slanted
interpretation of received evidence—the shading of ambiguous possibilities
to match the conclusion one prefers. As noted in the next section, however,
a major point of vulnerability in this process is the possibility that one’s
interlocutor really “has the goods” (or can uncover them in discovery) and
can produce the smoking gun evidence that will force reassessment of deeply
held beliefs.51 Rather than take that chance, the Court in Iqbal simply
deemed it “implausible” under the circumstances, thus negating any risk it
would have to reckon with contrary evidence.
In other words, the very advantage of the judiciary identified above—
that it is often compelled to hear and assess evidence when other deliberative
actors are not—also functions as a cognitive threat. In practice, it means
judges are more likely to encounter discomforting or challenging claims than

49
50

51

Id. at 682–83.
See Dorf, supra note 36, at 225 (explaining the Iqbal decision in terms of the Court believing that
wrongful conduct, if any, was the product of a “few-bad-apples narrative” rather than systematic
wrongdoing). See generally Chiraag Bains, “A Few Bad Apples”: How the Narrative of Isolated Misconduct
Distorts Civil Rights Doctrine, 93 IND. L.J. 29, 30 (2018) (arguing that “[t]he case law has developed
the way it has . . . because of the dominance of a particular narrative about civil rights violations,”
which some call the “‘Few Bad Apples’ story of civil rights violations”).
See Kunda, infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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are other public deliberators. The following section accordingly situates
dismissal as part of a continuum of motivated cognition that acts to shield
deliberators from thoughts they would rather not think and conclusions they
would rather not draw.
II. THE CONTINUUM OF MOTIVATED COGNITION: THREE COGNITIVE
CHECKPOINTS
People have preferences about the beliefs that they hold. That is to say,
they do not simply want to know the unvarnished truth; they want to believe
what they want to believe. And by the same token, there are also invariably
thoughts they would rather sweep under the rug. “[W]e all have things we
would rather avoid: things that are hard to hear, things that are difficult to
accept or even to acknowledge.”52 Such beliefs are often uncomfortably
dissonant with our core ideologies or self-conceptions, and so people try their
best to remove them from our epistemic lives.53
Motivated cognition, or motivated reasoning,54 describes the “less-thanconscious tendency to reason toward one’s preferred result.”55 “Everyday
experience confirms that people’s judgments are often biased by their beliefs,
desires, and vested interests,”56 and legal scholarship has not ignored the
problem. Typically, however, it has analyzed motivated cognition through
one particular mechanism: biased evaluation of ambiguous situations. For
example, a judge considering whether to exclude evidence from an arguably
unlawful search may be influenced by the egregiousness of the underlying
52
53

54

55
56

José Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice,
and Resistant Imaginations 34 (2013).
James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder & Robert F. Rich, Misinformation
and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship, 62 J. POL. 790, 794 (2000) (“[I]nconsistency causes
dissonance. Because dissonance is uncomfortable, the individual seeks to avoid it. Better, then, to
make inferences that fit one’s existing beliefs and attitudes than not.”); see also Daniel T. Gilbert
Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson, Stephen J. Blumberg, & Thalia P. Wheatley, Immune Neglect:
A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 619 (1998)
(discussing our “psychological immune system” that fights against hostile information threatening
to our sense of self); E. Tory Higgins, Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect, 94 PSYCHOL.
REV. 319, 319 (1987) (“The notion that people who hold conflicting or incompatible beliefs are
likely to experience discomfort has had a long history in psychology.”).
Technically speaking, one can refer to both directionally based and accuracy-based reasoning as
“motivated cognition” (either one is motivated by direction or by accuracy). See Ziva Kunda, The
Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480–81 (1990). For purposes of this article,
“motivated cognition” is considered to refer exclusively to the former.
Avani Mehta Sood, Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology and the Exclusionary Rule, 103 GEO.
L.J. 1543, 1547 (2015).
David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the
Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 119, 119 (2002).
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crime; her desire to punish a particularly vicious act may slant her appraisal
of the underlying legal issues.57 This will be termed “evaluative motivated
reasoning.”
But evaluative motivated reasoning is only part of a large continuum of
motivated cognition. Biased reasoning is only necessary if one needs to
consider an argument in the first place. If it can be dismissed out of hand—
or is never heard in the first place—then much taxing cognitive effort can be
avoided altogether. Hence, there are two prior “cognitive checkpoints” that
also serve to ward off discomforting thoughts—what will be called
“ignorance” and “dismissal.” Precisely because these latter maneuvers elide
the need to substantively reason at all, they can be far more effective—and
far more dangerous—than their more commonly acknowledged cousin.
Ignorance is, as one might expect, the state of simply not knowing the
challenging information. This can be purely coincidental, but it also
encompasses acts or structures whereby persons are able to effectively shun
sources of information which they predict will yield dissonance—for
example, liberals refusing to watch Fox News while conservatives skip past
MSNBC. Yet even if one does end up hearing a claim, one often can still
elect not to examine, investigate, or otherwise consider its details or
particulars. This is an act of dismissal—it parallels the civil procedure
concept, which also acts to terminate (judicial) consideration of a given (legal)
claim prior to the discovery process. These three mechanisms—ignorance,
dismissal, and evaluative moral reasoning—are part of a continuum58 of
motivated cognition whereby we protect ourselves from adopting beliefs
inconsistent with our priors.59
57

58

59

See Sood, supra note 55, at 1547 (finding experimental confirmation of this tendency); see also Jeffrey
A. Segal, Avani Mehta Sood, & Benjamin Woodson, The “Murder Scene Exception”—Myth or Reality?
Empirically Testing the Influence of Crime Severity in Federal Search-and-Seizure Cases, 105 VA. L. REV. 543,
578 (2019) (finding “suppression determinations in real search-and-seizure cases suggests that
federal Courts of Appeals judges generally appear significantly less likely to exclude challenged
evidence in cases involving crimes that carry higher maximum penalties as compared to lower
penalties”).
The description of motivated cognition as a continuum suggests that there are not sharp boundaries
between ignorance, dismissal, and evaluative motivated reasoning. Just how much awareness
moves a listener from ignorance to dismissal, or how much consideration is necessary to convert
dismissal into evaluative motivated reasoning, are matters of judgment. That each may sometimes
shade into the others does not significantly affect the concepts’ clarity.
In other words, all three processes—ignorance, dismissal, and evaluative motivated reasoning—
can be fit under the broader umbrella of motivated cognition. There is potential for confusion,
since in the literature “motivated reasoning” and “motivated cognition” are typically used
interchangeably. Avani Sood suggests that motivated cognition is the superior term because it
encompasses “not only active reasoning,” (what this Article is terming evaluative motivated
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To illustrate the difference between the three concepts, consider the
following example. Dana believes that racial discrimination in America,
particularly by authority figures, is rare and getting rarer. She is attached to
this viewpoint due to various ideological and social bonds, and therefore does
not like hearing about cases and circumstances which challenge her
optimistic view regarding America’s racial state. Josh is a person of color
who claims to have been racially profiled by the police. How might Dana
successfully dissipate the threat Josh’s allegation poses to her worldview?
The first answer is that Dana might remain ignorant about the allegation
altogether. Of course, there are all sorts of innocent reasons why Dana might
never hear about Josh’s incident—but there are also ways in which she can
stack the deliberative deck.60 For example, Dana might (consciously or not)
think that persons of color are more likely to make discomforting allegations
of racial prejudice and therefore be less likely to socialize with members of
other racial groups so as to reduce the probability that she will encounter
such a claim. Beyond her set of personal acquaintances, Dana might tailor
her media consumption to favor outlets which are less likely to devote
attention to discrimination claims and thus are less likely to pass along Josh’s
story. If she successfully avoids hearing about the claim, she need not expend
any additional effort rationalizing it.
Suppose, though, that Dana does become aware of Josh’s claim. Maybe
a friend raises Josh’s complaint, or maybe his story happened to be picked
up by the nightly news. Even still, it is rarely if ever the case that all the
details of a given situation emerge before the recipient of the information has
time to react. Though Dana now is aware of the basics of the issue—that
Josh alleges he was the victim of profiling—she need not entertain it as a live
possibility worthy of her time. She can also dismiss it as unworthy of
attention—“he is just playing the race card”—and thus justify refraining
from delving into the details that would ultimately ratify whether the claim
was a legitimate one or not.

60

reasoning) “but also more immediate forms of acquiring knowledge and understanding, such as
visual perception.” Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments—An Analytic Review, 9
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 309 (2013). One could simply call this final step in the continuum
“motivated reasoning” and the broader phenomenon “motivated cognition.” But this would be
idiosyncratic, and so to avoid confusion the label “evaluative motivated reasoning” is used to
distinguish it from other forms of motivated cognition which do not engage in explicit analysis of
the proffered claim.
Consider James Baldwin’s searing indictment of the “innocence” of Whites in the face of ongoing
racial injustice: “they have destroyed and are destroying hundreds of thousands of lives and do not
know it and do not want to know it. . . . [I]t is not permissible that the authors of devastation should
also be innocent. It is the innocence which constitutes the crime.” JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME
5–6 (Modern Library ed., 1995) (emphasis added).
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Despite her best efforts, however, there are circumstances where Dana
might be effectively forced to take Josh’s claims seriously. She might be Josh’s
friend (in which case accusing him of “playing the race card” would be quite
rude), she might encounter Josh’s case as part of the assigned reading in an
academic seminar, or she might be a jury member in Josh’s civil suit. In
these cases, powerful norms exist which compel Dana to listen to the whole
story and actually weigh the evidence presented. And this is the stage where
evaluative motivated reasoning comes into play. If the case is ambiguous or
the evidence unclear, Dana is likely to subtly interpret these ambiguities in
ways which are consistent with her worldview. Josh was exceeding the speed
limit (even if by only ten miles per hour), and the police officer did say that
his demeanor was suspicious given the time and neighborhood.
Because legal theorists naturally are concerned with the success and
failure of considered arguments, this last step—evaluative motivated
reasoning—is often given outsized attention in the legal literature. But it is
actually best thought of as the final checkpoint on a cognitive continuum that
also includes ignorance and dismissal. Far from being the sine qua non of
motivated cognition, it is often the move of last resort. Exploring how
ignorance and dismissal interact with their more familiar cousin provides a
richer understanding of the psychological processes which enable us to
protect deeply felt beliefs from external challenges.
A. Ignorance
Evaluative motivated reasoning allows for people to rationalize around
received information so that they do not threaten one’s cultural or ideological
priors. It relies on a biased appraisal of evidence—faced with a discussion
about, say, gun control or global warming, persons will selectively read the
arguments so as to fit within their preexisting beliefs.61 In other words, this
form of reasoning kicks in at the point where one is already relatively deeply
enmeshed in the merits of the dispute.

61

See Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Erica Dawson & Paul Slovic, Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened SelfGovernment, 1 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 54, 69 (2017) (noting that individuals with higher numeracy will
still reach conclusions congenial to their political outlooks, even when the data displays covariance);
Dan M. Kahan, Maggie Wittlin, Ellen Peters, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald
Braman & Gregory N. Mandel, The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality
Conflict, and Climate Change 9 (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 89),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1871503 [hereinafter Kahan et al., Risk-Perception Commons] (citing
evidence that two separate political groups were equally likely to hold mistaken beliefs about
“‘scientific consensus’ . . . on culturally charged risk issues such as . . . climate change, and gun
control” (citation omitted)).
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Hopefully, it is obvious why motivated reasoning of this sort does not
account for anything close to the majority of scenarios where a given claim
is not ratified by surrounding social actors. The overwhelming majority of
claims are not accepted as true not because they are evaluated and
discounted in a biased (or non-biased) manner, but because they are never
heard at all. Most people, obviously, remain ignorant of most claims. They
do not read, hear, or otherwise encounter them, and so they never have any
occasion to appraise them (whether dispassionately or not).
On its own, this might not be worthy of too much concern. There are
limits to the amount of information anyone can reasonably be expected to
process, and so the fact that most claims will not be appraised is true only in
the trivial and banal sense that a great many claims will never be given
attention. This might be all that needs to be said on the subject were it the
case that the distribution of heard and unheard claims was random. But this
is exceptionally unlikely to be true. It is quite clear that people frequently
structure their social worlds so that they are relatively unlikely to hear claims
that they would rather not consider. The most obvious and well-known form
this practice comes in the form of media selection—liberals do not watch
Fox, conservatives avoid MSNBC.62
Hence, the first cognitive checkpoint that helps ward off thoughts we
would rather not think is simply remaining ignorant about them in the first
place. “Ignorance,” Sharron Sullivan and Nancy Tuana observe, “often is
thought of as a gap in knowledge, as an epistemic oversight that easily could
be remedied once it has been noticed. It can seem to be an accidental byproduct of the limited time and resources that human beings have to
investigate and understand their world.”63 But ignorance can be quite
conscious and volitional: we specifically construct our social spheres so as to
minimize the situations where we come face-to-face with discomfiting claims.
As José Medina puts it:
Active ignorance is the kind of ignorance that is capable of protecting
itself, with a whole battery of defense mechanisms (psychological and
political) that can make individuals and groups insensitive to certain things,

62
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See generally Americans Spending More Time Following the News, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 12, 2010),
https://www.people-press.org/2010/09/12/americans-spending-more-time-following-the-news/
(providing analysis on cable news audiences in relation to demographics, including political
ideology).
Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana, Introduction to RACE AND EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE 1,
1 (Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana eds., 2007).
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that is, numbed to certain phenomena and bodies of evidence and unable to
learn in those domains.64
The Fox/MSNBC divide provides stark demonstration that ignorance is
more than just an acknowledgment of the inevitable limits of our attention
and cognitive resources, and can instead represent an active attempt to
distribute said resources to problems amenable to our ideological or cultural
desires.
Ignorance can also be an implicit or unconscious phenomenon. Consider
the concept of “aversive racism,” which plays a significant role in the related
literature on implicit bias.65 Aversive racism generally refers to interplay
between conscious egalitarian commitments and subconscious racial
prejudice, resulting in the imposition of racial inequalities only when they
can be justified by neutral rationales.66 But the “aversive” in “aversive
racism” refers to a practice of avoidance—because persons feel the
dissonance between their conscious desire for egalitarianism and their
subconscious prejudice, they learn to associate interracial interaction with
anxiety and discomfort and so become “averse” to and avoid such
engagements.67 In this way, the anxiety often felt towards interracial
interaction, and the ensuing self-segregation, can be seen as a form of
(motivated) ignorance.68
But ignorance need not be sought out—even subconsciously—to have
normative significance. It can also have a structural component that
transcends anyone’s conscious or unconscious choice to avoid hearing
certain types of assertions. Even absent such a decision, the sorts of claims
that are likely to emerge out of the infinite din of human experience and
make it onto the broader social radar screen are not randomly distributed.
This is true for at least two reasons. First, the default package of socially
salient issues that is immediately accessible without effort typically reflects
that which is important to particular empowered classes. “Ignorance” can
64
65

66
67
68

MEDINA, supra note 52, at 58.
See generally John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2004) (discussing aversive racism); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner,
Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315 (2000) [hereinafter
Dovidio & Gaertner, Selection Decisions] (presenting a study of averse racism); Samuel L. Gaertner &
John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61
(John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 65, at 7.
Gaertner & Dovidio, Aversive Form, supra note 65, at 36.
See Clarissa Rile Hayward, Responsibility and Ignorance: On Dismantling Structural Injustice, 79 J. POL. 396
(2017) (discussing the importance of disruptive politics because it can create structural change and
interrupt motivated ignorance); Charles W. Mills, White Ignorance, in EPISTEMOLOGIES OF
IGNORANCE, supra note 63, at 13.
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in some cases simply reflect a lack of epistemic curiosity: people accept the
default offerings and feel no desire to interrogate further.69 Moreover, “social
stratification” often helps insulate the beneficiaries of unjust systems “from
their effects; they experience all of the pleasure and see none of the pain.”70
Residential segregation, narrowly focused media, and government
responsiveness to the interests of certain social classes over others all
contribute to an unequal distribution of claims which receive meaningful
attention.
Second, even where social actors are affirmatively-engaged listeners, it
still might be the case that claims favored by particular groups will be less
able to be rendered intelligible and therefore will not be expressed. This is
what Miranda Fricker refers to as a “hermeneutical injustice.”71 A
hermeneutical injustice refers to the problem whereby “relations of unequal
power can skew shared hermeneutical resources” such that the perspectives
of the powerful are easily expressed through normal, well-understood social
narratives, while the powerless find that their understanding of their own
experiences is not quite as intelligible under these standard modes of
communication.72 Sexual harassment, prior to the popularization of the
term, is a paradigmatic example of a harm that was difficult to elucidate,
even for women, not just because of overt biases but also because the relevant
public knowledge for understanding it as a conceptually cohesive wrong had
yet to have been developed.73 Prior to the 1970s or 1980s, men could remain
ignorant of the problem of sexual harassment simply because there was not
yet any widely accepted language available that would render a claim of
“sexual harassment” intelligible.
The practical effects of ignorance, in its systematic dimension, is to render
certain types of opinions normal and others rare or aberrant—a person who
very infrequently hears claims of racial profiling will find the exceptions to
be, well, exceptional (even if the reason they are an exception is not their
infrequency but rather that most of the other examples were unaired or

69
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See MEDINA, supra note 52, at 33 (describing the epistemic vice resulting “from the privilege of not
needing to know is a lack of curiosity about those areas of life or those social domains that one has
learned to avoid or not to concern oneself with”).
David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1304 (2013); see also Robin DiAngelo, White
Fragility, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 54, 58 (2011) (“Growing up in segregated environments[,]
. . . white interests and perspectives are almost always central. An inability to see or consider
significance in the perspectives of people of color results.”).
FRICKER, supra note 3, at 147.
Id. at 148.
See id. at 149–51. See generally Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women:
A Case of Sex Discrimination (1979).
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otherwise failed to register). And in turn, the content of the ‘normal’ or
‘typical’ opinions registered in a particular social context has an impact on
what opinions are likely to be presented in the future. People do not simply
blurt out any thought or claim on their mind; they are far more likely to do
so when they feel their arguments are in tune with the opinions of those
around them, and are far more likely to keep silent when they do not.74 This
reticence has a cascading effect: persons do not voice opinions they think are
unpopular, further marginalizing their public salience and making it even
less likely that such thoughts will gain airing in the future.75 The result is
what Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann calls a “spiral of silence.”76 And the
hermeneutical maldistribution identified by Fricker amplifies the effect: it
limits the rhetorical resources available even for dissidents who are willing to
buck the dominant trend. In this way, patterns of ignorance are able to
replicate and sustain themselves with considerable vigor and longevity.
B. Dismissal
Another form of suppressing—or more accurately, evading—dissonance
is through dismissal. Dismissal is a species of motivated cognition in that it
is a form of direction-oriented (rather than accuracy-oriented) reasoning.77
But unlike evaluative motivated reasoning, which is a (biased) means for
assessing the evidence of a proposition, dismissal occurs when one refuses to
consider the claim at all.

74

75

76

77

Frances Bowen & Kate Blackmon, Spirals of Silence: The Dynamic Effects of Diversity on Organizational
Voice, 40 J. MGMT. STUDS. 1393, 1396 (2003) (“People’s willingness to express their opinions is
influenced not only by their own personal opinions, but also by their external environment,
particularly what they perceive as the prevailing ‘climate of opinion’. [sic] When they are not sure
that they agree with the majority, people are reluctant to express their opinions.”).
Id. (“When people perceive that they share the dominant opinion they will speak out, strengthening
this position, whilst those who perceive that they hold the minority opinion will become more silent,
diminishing their position.” (citation omitted)); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999) (arguing that prevalent or expressed
opinions have a tendency to “cascade”—they “trigger chains of individual responses that make
these perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their rising availability in public
discourse”).
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion, 24 J. COMM. 43, 44 (1974)
(“The more individuals perceive these tendencies and adapt their views accordingly, the more the
one faction appears to dominate and the other to be on the downgrade. Thus, the tendency of the
one to speak up and the other to be silent starts off a spiraling process which increasingly establishes
one opinion as the prevailing one.”). See generally ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF
SILENCE: PUBLIC OPINION—OUR SOCIAL SKIN (1984).
See Kunda, supra note 54, at 480–81 (“The motivated reasoning phenomena . . . fall into two major
categories: those in which the motive is to arrive at an accurate conclusion, whatever it may be, and
those in which the motive is to arrive at a particular, directional conclusion.”).
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In other work, I have sketched the basic concept of dismissal through the
case of the “bad faith” response to charges of discrimination—for example,
alleging that a discrimination claimant is just “playing the race card.”78 More
detail on this example is provided below,79 but here it suffices to note that the
key attribute of the bad faith response—what makes it a form of dismissal—is
that it dispenses with the claim without having to engage with it on its merits.
To say that someone is “playing the race card” is to say that their claim is
fundamentally illicit—a ploy done for tactical advantage rather than an
organic attempt to advance discussion—and therefore need not be taken
seriously.80 This maneuver justifies refraining from engaging in reasoned
deliberation over the discrimination claim, which in turn dissipates the risk
that one might have to accept its validity.
In many circumstances, dismissal can be thought of as a special case of
what Miranda Fricker calls a “testimonial injustice.” A testimonial injustice
occurs where “prejudice on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker
less credibility than he would otherwise have given.”81 Often times the
decision to dismiss is indeed tied to assessments about the claimant’s
reliability that are explicitly prejudicial.82 The rhetoric surrounding the
“race card” claim, for example, frequently relies upon notions that
marginalized persons are epistemically incredible—they lack objectivity or
dispassionate neutrality compared to putatively unmarked majoritarian
observers.83 Calling into question the capacity of marginalized persons to
make credible claims in the public sphere is an easy means of dispensing with
their arguments without having to engage with their substance.
But like ignorance, dismissal can also result from structural factors that
do not necessarily implicate even implicit personal biases. For example, our
prior beliefs about what is likely to be relevant or useful information in
carrying inquiry forward may cause us to discount particular testimonial
offerings—refusing to engage with them as part of an ongoing political or

78
79
80
81
82
83

See generally David Schraub, Playing with Cards: Discrimination Claims and the Charge of Bad
Faith, 42 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 285 (2016).
See infra Part III.
Schraub, supra note 78, at 285.
FRICKER, supra note 3, at 4; see also Schraub, supra note 78, at 286.
Schraub, supra note 78, at 295–96.
See id.; DERRICK BELL, THE RULES OF RACIAL STANDING, IN FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM, 109, 113 (1992) (noting that Black people speaking about
racism will be viewed as “less effective witnesses than are whites . . . . reflect[ing] a widespread
assumption that blacks, unlike whites, cannot be objective on racial issues”). Bell also provides for
an important exception: when members of marginalized groups criticize members of their own
community, then their testimony will be accorded enhanced weight. Id. at 114–15.
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social debate.84 Return to Fricker’s concept of a “hermeneutical injustice,”
whereby we lack the relevant language to understand a given claim as part
of a generalizable or systematic experience recognized as wrong.85 Fricker
focuses on the knower who cannot effectively articulate her own experience.
But there is a related problem for the listener who fails to adequately perceive
potentially valid claims due to an overly cramped and partial account of the
relevant principles. These are two sides of the same coin: the shared problem
is that differing hermeneutical resources make certain types of claims
(favored by certain types of persons) easy to process while rendering others
opaque.86
In the discrimination context, for example, the prevailing narrative of the
concept might cast discrimination as something extreme (Nazi- or Klan-like)
or rare.87 If this is how discrimination is understood, then a discrimination
claim which lacks these characteristics (for example, complaining about
microaggressions or paternalism) might feel discordant or ridiculous even by
one who does not believe that the claimant’s class should generally have their
credibility discounted. Such listeners would justify brushing this sort of
discrimination claim aside because it refers to something too minor, or to
something that would implicate too many people, to be properly labeled
“discrimination.”88
It is hopefully clear how these two bases for dismissal—the testimonial
and the hermeneutical—can end up reinforcing one another and further
foster harmful attitudes and practices towards marginalized persons. If
marginalized persons regularly level claims which feel groundless because
84

85
86

87

88

Christopher Hookway, Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker, 7 EPISTEME 151, 157–
58 (2010) (“There could be a form of injustice related to assertion and testimony that consisted, not
in a silencing refusal to take the testimony to be true or expressing knowledge, but in a refusal to
take seriously the ability of the agent to provide information that is relevant in the current context.”).
See FRICKER, supra note 3, at 147–51 and accompanying text.
See DRYZEK, supra note 21, at 70–71 (contending that political argument “involves communication
in the terms set by the powerful, who almost by definition are those best able to articulate their
arguments in terms of the dominative speech culture of a society”).
Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the United States, 55 RUTGERS
L. REV. 903, 948 (2003) (“The dominant perception of a ‘racist’ is only the most extreme example—
a person who rabidly hates, often to the point of violence, persons from other racialized groups.”).
See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (rejecting an early
attempt to bring suit on a sexual harassment theory because “holding such activity to be actionable
under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or
sexually oriented advances toward another”); David Hirsh, Struggles Over the Boundaries of Legitimate
Discourse: Antizionism, Bad-Faith Allegations and The Livingstone Formulation, in 5 GLOBAL ANTISEMITISM: A CRISIS OF MODERNITY 89, 89 (Charles Asher Small ed., 2013) (recounting a
conversation with a Dutch friend who asserted that “in the Netherlands one would not characterise
[sic] [the play Seven Jewish Children] as anti-Semitic” because “[a]fter the Holocaust the word
‘antisemitic’ was too strong”); see also infra Part IV.C.1.
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they fall into a hermeneutical gap, it is easy to arrive at the mistaken belief
that these persons simply lack a reasoned or “objective” view of the relevant
facts or principles and can therefore be discounted. Likewise, to the extent
that marginalized persons are most likely to perceive a lacuna in the
dominant understanding of important social norms, a testimonial injustice
which preemptively discredits minority perspectives makes it more difficult
for their observations to receive fair consideration or for their understandings
to be incorporated in publicly intelligible conceptions of the relevant
principles.
Other scholars have recognized that people often act to pre-screen extant
claims on criteria which have little to do with claim’s substantive merits. In
discussing their idea of a psychological “immune system,” Daniel Gilbert and
his colleagues present a very simple example: the decision to “dismiss[,] as a
rule[,] all remarks that begin with ‘[y]ou drooling imbecile.’”89 This
dismissal is done as a substitution for actually engaging with the substantive
merits of the remark (which, given the introduction, are likely to be hurtful
or at least unsettling). Eileen Braman has made the important contribution
of connecting this phenomenon to legal behavior: her research found that
decisions regarding “threshold” legal questions like standing were
significantly influenced by study participants’ views of the underlying claim
(at least in ambiguous cases with no controlling legal precedent).90 Even
though standing decisions nominally are wholly apart from the substantive
merits of a legal case, there is a greater propensity to dismiss cases on standing
grounds when doing so will forestall having to consider a potentially hostile
claim on its merits.
Like all forms of motivated cognition, it is easy to think of dismissal in
purely negative, even opportunistic terms. So it is important to stress that,
just as with ignorance, dismissal begins from a simple and important truth:
there are many demands upon our cognitive facilities throughout the day,
and we must prioritize what areas receive our attention. “The quantity and
variety of social stimulation available at any time is vastly greater than a
person can process or even attend to. Therefore, individuals are necessarily
selective in what they notice, learn, remember, or infer in any situation.”91
Gilbert’s ‘drooling imbecile’ example perhaps provides a fine case of a
circumstance where dismissal may be perfectly appropriate.92
89
90
91
92

Gilbert et al., supra note 53, at 619.
Braman, supra note 28, at 315.
Hazel Markus, Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self, 35 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 63,
63 (1977).
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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Yet it is evident why discursive dismissal carries significant potential for
abuse. Most obviously, what sorts of claims strike us as facially implausible
will depend greatly on our past experiences, and hence social stratification
can yield wide gaps in what sorts of statements seem reasonable versus
farcical even amongst well-meaning deliberators.93 Persons who occupy
epistemically privileged positions—who are unused to having their cognitive
authority questioned or whose social appraisals are generally accorded
respect—may be ill-equipped to critically reconsider their instincts in
response to unfamiliar challenges.94 And when we reckon with the fact that
people also have motivated reasons for preferring to grapple with certain
sorts of claims while ignoring others, the problem intensifies further still.95
Dismissal is motivationally useful because it obviates the need to consider
arguments or evidence that might be brought to bear in favor of threatening
claims. Structuring our thought-processes such that claim-classes likely to be
discomforting are coded as facially implausible or ludicrous allows for
potentially dissonant claims to be headed off without having to do the hard
cognitive work of actually reasoning around the merits of the case.
Moreover, if we are refraining from considering a given claim solely
because we need to triage scarce deliberative resources, then we have no
grounds to speak to the potential validity of the claim. We should, as Fricker
observes, reserve judgment on its merit until such time as it can be given
proper attention.96 The fact that dismissal so frequently comes attached to
evaluative statements about the claimant (through terms like ‘bad faith,’
‘implausible,’ ‘playing the race card’ and so on), however, suggests that more
is going on than dispassionate attempts at prioritization.
And while anyone is capable of dismissal, it carries particular potency
when conjoined with social power. One of the more important attributes of
power, after all, is that “you can opt not to listen. And you do so with
93

94

95
96

See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1106–17 (2008) (providing
empirical evidence supporting significant gaps in how White and Black people, and men and
women, perceive potential cases of discrimination); David R. Maines, Information Pools and Racialized
Narrative Structures, 40 SOC. Q. 317, 317–26 (1999) (explaining that social stratification causes White
and Black people to draw from different “pools” in terms of where they get background
information).
See MEDINA, supra note 52, at 30 (discussing the problem of being “epistemically spoiled”); see also
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 17 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859) (expressing disdain for
“princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference” because such persons are not
habituated to considering challenging perspectives and therefore are effectively unable to
acknowledge their own fallibility).
See Robinson, supra note 93, at 1124 (noting that “an individual’s social position shapes his
willingness to pursue information about a particular topic.”).
FRICKER, supra note 3, at 172.
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impunity.”97 Persons with power can often unilaterally set the conceptual
boundaries of a given conversation, and thereby “preemptively silence”
perspectives which might—if given due consideration—present an effective
challenge.98 By contrast, a position of vulnerability makes it more likely “that
one will need to attend to what others are likely to notice”99—while
marginalized persons certainly can (under the right circumstances) argue
against the principles or assertions of the dominant classes, they are rarely in
a position to simply wave them aside outright.100 At the same time, persons
holding epistemic power—who are in a privileged position to articulate what
counts as valid knowledge and who are considered to be a valid exponents of
potential claims—have every incentive to preserve their advantaged status.101
Dismissing marginalized or alternative perspectives helps preserve this
epistemic primacy.
C. (The Limits of) Evaluative Motivated Reasoning
The structure and importance of evaluative motivated reasoning in legal
decision-making has been analyzed in great detail elsewhere,102 so no more
than a basic sketch will be given here. Instead the focus is on how, despite
the outsized attention paid to it in the legal literature, this particular form of
motivated cognition is only a partial, and in some ways unideal, solution to
the threat posed by a discomfiting allegation. The purpose is not to discount
evaluative motivated reasoning as an important phenomenon, but rather to
situate it as one part of a broader continuum of cognitive practices.
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Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation: The 1984 James McCormick
Mitchell Lecture, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 62 (1985).
Eric Reitan, Rape as an Essentially Contested Concept, 16 HYPATIA 43, 50 (2001) (“[I]f any one party
has the power to unilaterally determine the conceptual framework that will be used in assessing a
normative problem, that party will be able to preemptively silence certain dissenting voices.”).
Gaile Pohlhaus Jr., Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful
Hermeneutical Ignorance, 27 HYPATIA 715, 721 (2012).
MEDINA, supra note 52, at 44 (noting that marginalized persons are often forced to understand and
consider seriously the perspectives of dominant groups as a condition of social survival).
See infra Part IV.C.2 (noting the benefits of adopting “epistemically self-privileg[ing]” frames of
knowledge).
See, e.g., Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization
Goals, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1345 (2012) (exploring “outcome-driven perceptions of harm in
the context of the long-debated role of harm in criminal regulation”); Dan M. Kahan, Foreword:
Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2
(2011) (arguing that constitutional decision-making is the “focus of status competition among groups
whose members are unconsciously motivated to fit perceptions of the Court’s decisions to their
values”); Sood, supra note 55 (discussing the exclusionary rule). See generally Sood, supra note 59
(reviewing the literature on motivated cognition in legal judgments).
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Evaluative motivated reasoning describes “the unconscious tendency of
individuals to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal
extrinsic to the formation of accurate beliefs.”103 It refers to how we process
received information. We see the protest, we listen to the witness. In this, it
differs significantly from both ignorance and dismissal. In an ignorance
scenario, of course, there is no received information to be processed—the
listener is unaware that the relevant charge has been made. And in a
dismissal case, the listener has elected to refrain from receiving most of the
relevant information—they are eliminating the allegation as a valid or
worthy hypothesis prior to engaging with it on its merits.
Focusing on the biased appraisal of received evidence, evaluative
motivated reasoning understates how biases affect not just how we process
information, but how we make initial decisions regarding what sort of
information is worthy of our attention. One recent study used visualattention trackers to see how people observed videos documenting physical
altercations between members of an outgroup and the police.104 It found
that persons devoted more of their visual attention to the party they were
predisposed to see as the wrongdoer (so persons hostile to the police looked
more at the police; those with negative attitudes towards the outgroup looked
more at the civilian).105 Reacting to the study, which he labeled “the runaway winner in the contest for ‘coolest study of the year,’” Dan Kahan wrote:
Before reading this study, I would have assumed the effect of cultural
cognition was generated in the process of recollection: that people were
fitting bits and pieces of recalled images onto narrative templates featuring
police force and the like[.]
But [these] findings suggest the dynamic that generates opposing
perceptions in these cases commences much earlier, before the subjects even
take in the visual images.
The identity-protective impressions people form originate in a kind of
biased sampling: by training their attention on the actor who they have the
greatest stake in identifying as the wrongdoer, people are . . . prospecting in
that portion of the visual landscape most likely to contain veins of data that
fit their preconceptions.106
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106

Kahan, supra note 102, at 19.
See generally Yael Granot, Emily Balcetis, Kristin E. Schneider & Tom R. Tyler, Justice is Not
Blind: Visual Attention Exaggerates Effects of Group Identification on Legal Punishment, 143 J.
EXP. PSYCH. 2196 (2014).
Id. at 2205.
Dan Kahan, What “Bodycams” Can and Can’t Be Expected To Do. . . Plus Coolest Study of
the Year, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (Dec. 25, 2014, 1:16 PM), http://www.culturalcogniti
on.net/blog/2014/12/25/what-bodycams-can-and-cant-be-expected-to-do-plus-coolest-st.html.
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In other words, what made the study so fascinating was that it revealed
just how early in the deliberative life-cycle motivational concerns came into
play. They did not only affect how people reasoned through received
information, they also played a dramatic role in determining what sort of
information people elected to focus on in the first place.
To be sure, the assumption that persons have received and are analyzing
(albeit in a biased manner) substantial information is a valid one in certain
contexts. A juror in a civil or criminal case feels obligated (one hopes) to pay
close attention to the statements of a witness. A student in a classroom feels
obligated (one hopes) to consider the assigned readings carefully. And it is
likely that laboratory settings, where there are a variety of explicit means and
implicit norms encouraging participants to pay close attention to whatever
project they have been assigned, emphasize the salience of this particular
mode of reasoning. Laboratories, classrooms, and courtrooms are special
cases where we have strong social and cultural pressure to pay attention to
information. If while serving on a jury a witness upsets us, we cannot simply
change the channel. For the most part, however, this is an exception and not
the rule. Nothing normally forces us to pay any attention to claims we would
rather not consider.
Meanwhile, evaluative motivated reasoning has several drawbacks that
limit its usefulness as a means of avoiding discomfiting conclusions. First, it
is cognitively taxing. It requires the subject to fully engage in the social
question in order to construct a reasonable-seeming interpretation that
coheres to their prior beliefs. This “requires cognitive resources to carry
through.”107 Motivated reasoning is in fact positively correlated with
cognitive ability—persons with more cognitive resources are better able to
rationalize towards the results they want.108 This makes it a risky proposition
in situations where cognitive resources may be drained.
Second, motivated cognition is not always reliable. Evaluative motivated
reasoning is not infinitely elastic; it only works if sufficient evidence exists to
support a favorable outcome. “[P]eople motivated to arrive at a particular
107

108

Neeru Paharia, Kathleen D. Vohs, & Rohit Deshpandé, Sweatshop Labor is Wrong Unless the Shoes are
Cute: Cognition Can Both Help and Hurt Moral Motivated Reasoning, 121 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DEC.
PROCESSES 81, 87 (2013) (finding that persons “under cognitive load were less able to endorse the
use of sweatshop labor than if they were not under cognitive load”).
See, e.g., Dries Trippas, Simon J. Handley & Michael F. Verde, Fluency and Belief Bias in Deductive
Reasoning: New Indices for Old Effects, 5 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 631, at p.6 (2014) (finding that “higher
cognitive ability . . . leads to increased motivated reasoning”); Kahan et al., Risk-Perception Commons,
supra note 61, at 9 (finding that scientific literacy increases the divergence in opinions over
controversial scientific questions because greater facility with technical reasoning enables persons
to more easily construct desirable-yet-plausible conclusions).

1350

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:5

conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justification of their
desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw
the desired conclusion only if they can muster up the evidence necessary to
support it.”109 But at the outset of a conversation, the existence of such
ambiguous evidence cannot be guaranteed—sometimes one’s interlocutor
really has the goods. In that case, a person would still be left to reckon with
the dissonance.
Dismissal and ignorance circumvent these risks. One need not expend
effort reasoning around a given claim, nor incur any serious risk that it will
prove impossible to credibly reject for non-motivated reasons, if it is never
heard or dismissed out of hand. For these reasons, it is likely that motivated
cognition in its evaluative form is perhaps the barrier of last resort—it
emerges in those relatively rare circumstances where we are forced to hear
and substantively reckon with arguments that promote thoughts we would
rather not think.
III. THE HARMS OF DISMISSAL
While each of these three cognitive checkpoints interlock to ward off
unamenable claims, the remainder of this Article primarily focuses on the
particular problem of dismissal. Practically speaking, dismissal impacts a
wide range of potential social claims without an immediately obvious form
of resolution. The fix for ignorance is relatively straight-forward (if not
always easy to implement): publicize the claim. Beyond that, in general a
person who has successfully remained ignorant of an unamenable claim will
not be in an adjudicative position with respect to it. In an informal context
(for example, participation in public debate), the act of partaking in
discussion about an issue presupposes that one has at least heard of it.
Likewise in a formal context (e.g., a lawsuit or official complaint), by
definition once that claim has been placed on the relevant docket the first
checkpoint has been overcome—the respondent is on notice that there is a
claim in play, and now must elect how to deal with it.110
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110

Kunda, supra note 54, at 482–83.
This is, I admit, too simple. A broad claim can make its way onto a judicial docket even as the
adjudicators remain ignorant of certain localized knowledge or inferences important to the proper
disposition of the case. Depending on the particularities of the case, there may be no legally
cognizable pathway for communicating this knowledge unto the judges and so they may maintain
an effective “ignorance” regarding it even as they are forced, in some sense, to “consider” the case
itself. Cf. David Schraub, Torgerson’s Twilight: The Antidiscrimination Jurisprudence of Judge Diana E.
Murphy, 103 MINN. L. REV. 65, 76–77 (2018). But I cannot pursue that point further here.
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The problems posed by evaluative motivated reasoning are not as easy to
resolve, but they also do not cover large swaths of deliberative activity.
Outside of a few specialized social contexts—a laboratory, a jury box, a
classroom—nobody can force us to actually fully deliberate on topics we
would rather dismiss. In day-to-day life, much of the important action comes
when we consider which claims are worthy of deliberative attention and
which are not. This determination necessarily occurs prior to having much
of the substantive content that would ultimately decide whether the claim in
question is true or false. Indeed, one of the more dangerous attributes of
dismissal is its peculiarly self-insulating character.111 Unlike motivated
cognition, which can be overcome given sufficiently weighty evidence,
dismissal operates a step earlier in the discursive process by refusing to admit
certain classes of evidence at all. Consequently, it largely lacks the
boundaries of plausibility that rein in motivated cognition.
Consider a case of dismissal which relies on the “poisoning the well”
fallacy, whereby a person’s group membership makes them and their claims
inherently untrustworthy.112 This rejoinder blocks the consideration of any
assertion that could be made, “no matter how good it is, or how much it [is]
based on good evidence.”113 “It is thus no wonder that so many prominent
negative stereotypes key in on the supposed unreliability of the targeted
group—devious and conspiring Jews, irrational and emotional women,
simple and unsophisticated blacks.”114
This illustrates a further problem associated with dismissal: it often comes
attached to some particularly pernicious dignitary harms not shared by its
two playmates. Neither ignorance nor evaluative motivated reasoning makes
explicit any negative attitudes about the person whose allegations are going
unheeded. But dismissal is different. In order to reject a known claim prior
to substantive evaluation, dismissal frequently requires explicit negative
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Cf. Schraub, supra note 78, at 286 (“[P]rejudice yields the injustice, and simultaneously wards off
complaints aimed at attacking the prejudice.”).
See Douglas N. Walton, Poisoning the Well, 20 ARGUMENTATION 273, 275 (2006) (describing, as the
paradigmatic case of the fallacy, the claim by Charles Kingsley that “Cardinal Newman’s claims
were not [to] be trusted because, as a . . . Catholic[,] . . . Newman’s first loyalty was not to the
truth”).
Id. at 276.
Schraub, supra note 78, at 295–96 (citing Linda Martin Alcoff, On Judging Epistemic Credibility, in
ENGENDERING RATIONALITIES 53, 61 n.32 (Nancy Tuana & Sandra Morgan eds., 2001)
(“Peasants, slaves, women, children, Jews, and many other nonelites were said to be liars or simply
incapable of distinguishing justified beliefs from falsehoods. Women were too irrational, peasants
too ignorant, children too immature, and Jews too cunning.”).
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assertions regarding the claimant—that they are uncredible, untrustworthy,
paranoid, or delusional.115
This, of course, is a dignitary harm all on its own—it undermines a
person’s status as a “knower,” the sort of person who can possess and transmit
useful knowledge, which is an inherent wrong.116 But it comes attached to
further secondary wrongs. Dismissal necessarily impacts the “epistemic
confidence” of the targeted group, whose instincts regarding their own
experience are taken to be so transparently ludicrous that they need not even
be given a hearing.117 “When you find yourself in a situation in which you
seem to be the only one to feel the dissonance between received
understanding and your own intimated sense of a given experience, it tends
to knock your faith in your own ability to make sense of the world.”118
Importantly, the rhetoric that supports dismissal typically goes beyond
alleging that the target is simply “wrong or mistaken.” Rather, it presents
her as “being in no condition to judge whether she is wrong or mistaken.
The accusations are about the target’s basic rational competence—her
ability to get facts right, to deliberate, her basic evaluative competencies and
ability to react appropriately: her independent standing as a deliberator and
moral agent.”119 At the extreme, this message can be so internalized that the
target entirely loses confidence that her felt experiences or instincts bear any
correlation to an objective reality; and so she refrains from articulating them
altogether. At this stage, dismissal can loop back around into ignorance—if
a targeted group does not believe that its thoughts (or particular categories of
thoughts) are rational ones worthy of being aired in the public sphere, it is
unlikely to present them at all in the first place.
Indeed, dismissal is dangerous precisely because of how easily it can move
“up the ladder” to exacerbate the problem of ignorance. Earlier, this Article
identified two mechanisms through which ignorance can self-replicate—that
is, how the relative dearth of claims making a given assertion renders it less
115
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See Schraub, supra note 78, at 295–96; Kate Abramson, Turning Up the Lights on Gaslighting, 28 PHIL.
PERSP. 1, 5 (2014) (“[I]t’s important to consider the variety of ways . . . women are dismissed—e.g.
‘too sensitive’, ‘paranoid’, ‘crazy’ ‘prude’ or the peculiarly existentialist dismissal of ‘bad faith’.”).
FRICKER, supra note 3, at 44.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 163; see also Noelle-Neumann, supra note 76, at 44 (contending that when a particular opinion
seems to be rare, adherents will find themselves uncertain and may become reticent to express their
views; “the more this appears to be so, the more uncertain he will become of himself, and the less
he will be inclined to express his opinion”).
Abramson, supra note 115, at 8. Abramson and Fricker both recount a passage in Simone de
Beauvoir’s diary where, after a long-ranging discussion with Jean-Paul Sartre, she was left so
dispirited in her reasoning that she said, “I’m no longer sure what I think, or even if I think at all.”
Id. at 4; FRICKER, supra note 3, at 50.
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likely that such claims will be aired in the future. The first, associated with
Fricker, is the idea of a hermeneutical injustice—the maldistribution of
interpretative resources which make it harder for outgroups to describe their
situations in recognizable and socially compelling ways.120 The second,
elucidated by Noelle-Neumann, is the “spiral of silence” where people are
more comfortable expressing common views and more reticent to express
rare ones.121 Dismissal can feed into both mechanisms. The rhetoric of
dismissal tends to present the interpretive frames proffered by the claimant
as illegitimate and the testimonial offerings of the claimant as irrational. The
former contributes to the hermeneutical gap by limiting the array of social
presentations seen as valid; the latter promotes the spiral of silence by
converting an unpopular opinion into a wholesale indictment of the speaker’s
deliberative capacity.
Dismissal thus has significant negative consequences with respect to its
impact on the target. But it also breaches a more general obligation that
comes attached to our status as democratic deliberators: our duty to listen.
Democratic citizenship does not require universal agreement on contested
issues. But it does require that we commit to giving each other’s claims a fair
hearing and due consideration.122 Public conversation and debate is the
primary arena we have for engaging in such consideration. Unlike “the
privacy and anonymity of the ballot box,” where “we have no chance to
review our own judgments against what others have to say,” the purpose of
public argument is precisely to at least provide the opportunity to “revise and
reconsider our positions.”123 Dismissal—the decision to decline to listen—
circumvents that process.
It is important to note that dismissal is a problem that stands separate
from whether the underlying claim ultimately has merit. Of course, dismissal
entails declining to substantively address an extant claim, and that implies
that certain claims that should be ratified will instead be ignored. But even
if a given claim should—after due consideration—be rejected, it would still
be problematic if the claimant was in fact never given the opportunity to
120
121
122

123

See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
Brandon Morgan-Olsen, A Duty to Listen: Epistemic Obligations and Public Deliberation, 39 SOC. THEORY
& PRAC. 185, 188 (2013) (“There is no conduit from a citizen’s lips to the exercise of political power
save the ears of others, and to fail to listen fair-mindedly in the public square can thereby represent
a failure to acknowledge another’s status as citizen.”); see also IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION
AND DEMOCRACY 24 (2000) (arguing that rational political discussion requires that participants
enter into the conversation with the goal—not guarantee—of agreement).
ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 150 (1995); see also Fred O. Smith, Jr., Due Process,
Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 611–13 (2014).
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receive such consideration.124 Much of the public outrage over the Trayvon
Martin killing, for example, arose not only because of the actual death of a
young Black teenager but because the police initially did not arrest his
shooter, instead seeming to instantly credit George Zimmerman’s claim of
self-defense.125 Even if one thinks that the evidence that was ultimately
produced was insufficient to prove Zimmerman guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, the initial failure to seriously investigate it as a potential homicide—
to effectively dismiss the possibility that it was a murder—is hard to square
with any commitment to epistemic equality and is a wrong in and of itself.
On that front, it is noteworthy how many of the most significant Black Lives
Matter protests commenced because of the perception that authorities were
not even initiating a serious investigation into racist violence against Black
men and women. Ahmaud Arbery's case surged to public prominence when
a local prosecutor declined to recommend charges against his killers,
concluding that the shooters had attempted a "perfectly legal" citizen's arrest
of Arbery as a burglary suspect.126 As this article went to press, citizens and
activists continued to demand justice for Breonna Taylor, emphasizing that
no officer had yet been charged months after Taylor was killed during a
nighttime "no-knock" raid at her house.127 A significant motivator of the
“Black Lives Matter” movement, it seems, is not just about the specific
outcomes of individual cases but also a more general sense that allegations of
violence against Black persons are systematically dismissed as valid
candidates for investigation.128
The confidence that one’s contributions to the debate were given due
consideration, even if the outcome is unfavorable, matters. Tom Tyler’s
work on “procedural justice” amasses powerful evidence that people place
124

125

126

127

128

See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (1978) (“Both the right to be heard
from, and the right to be told why, are analytically distinct from the right to secure a different
outcome . . . .”); Harel & Kahana, supra note 25, at 238–39 (articulating the right of a judicial
hearing that is “valued independently of the merit of the decision likely to be generated at the end
of this process”).
See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society,
91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (2013) (noting that “[t]he failure of the Sanford police department to
arrest Zimmerman” after he asserted he acted in self-defense “created a firestorm of protests”).
See Erik Ortiz, Were Pursuit and Killing of Ahmaud Arbery 'Perfectly Legal'? It's Not That Simple, NBC
NEWS (May 13, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/was-pursuit-killing-ahmaudarbery-perfectly-legal-it-s-not-n1205581.
Josh Wood, Breonna Taylor Killing: Call for Justice Intensifies after Months of Frustration, GUARDIAN (July
26, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jul/26/breonna-taylor-killing-justicelouisville-kentucky.
See David Schraub & Joel Sati, Epistemic Injustice in Collecting and Appraising Evidence, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO EVIDENCE (Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn eds.)
(forthcoming 2021).
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considerable independent weight on the knowledge that their voices were
heard, even where they know they did not affect the ultimate conclusion.129
It follows that people will experience an injustice when their attempts to enter
into social conversation are systematically rebuffed; and they do not conflate
this treatment with considered disagreement regarding the merits of their
position even though the tangible outcomes might be identical. There is, in
other words, a significant and morally salient distinction between rejecting a
claim because after serious consideration we conclude it is untenable, and
rejecting a claim because we conclude the person bringing it simply is not
worthy of our attention (even if the underlying facts of the claim are the
same).130 Dismissal implicates the latter set of concerns; the problem of
dismissal is not that of ill-formed or even biased appraisal of the merits of a
given controversy, but the failure to even acknowledge the controversy as a
legitimate entrant into public conversation.
The ideal theory response to dismissal might seem to be a demand that
all claims in all contexts be given full, fair, and charitable review.
Unfortunately, we do not live in an ideal world, and in particular we lack the
surfeit of deliberative resources that would allow us to give every single
proffered claim this sort of full hearing.131 What are our deliberative
obligations given these limitations?
Most obviously, those claims that are left aside due to the inability to
devote proper attention to them still cannot be justly rejected. We can only
(and should only) reserve judgment on them until such time as they are able
to be given their due consideration.132 This may mean that judgment on
certain claims are deferred more-or-less indefinitely; this is an injustice, but
a lesser one (and a more unavoidable one) than outright rejecting them
without providing reasoned argument.

129

130

131

132

See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 149 (2006) (finding that people do not need
to know that their contribution affected the outcome for them to consider the outcome legitimate,
but they do need to know that their contribution was considered).
Cf. David Hirsh, Accusations of Malicious Intent in Debates about the Palestine-Israel Conflict and
about Anti-Semitism: The Livingstone Formulation, ‘Playing the Antisemitism Card’ and
Contesting the Boundaries of Antiracist Discourse, 1 TRANSVERSAL 47, 47–48 (2010)
(distinguishing between “those who are accused of employing antisemitic discourse and who
respond in a measured and rational way to such accusations in a good faith effort to relate to the
concern, and to refute it” and those who refuse outright “to engage with the issue of antisemitism”).
See Mark E. Warren, Deliberative Democracy and Authority, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 46, 57–58 (1996)
(noting that there will always be limits on the amount of time and attention persons can devote to
particular issues); MEDINA, supra note 52, at 33 (“[O]nly a superhuman knower could be always
ready to embark on every possible discovery journey that comes her way.”).
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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More concretely, recognizing the particular biases in dismissal suggests
that we should expend considerable effort in ensuring that the claims that we
do consider come from a diverse and representative cross-sample of the
community. Recall that the wrong of both dismissal and ignorance is less the
inescapable fact that not every claim will be considered and more the
maldistribution of deliberative expenditures to favor the sorts of claims which
are amenable to dominant social groups.133 Consequently, political
deliberation should take special attention towards ensuring that marginalized
perspectives are given opportunity to voice their claims.134 As Fricker
observes, the key virtue that needs to be brought to bear to correct
testimonial injustices is the possession of “reflexive critical awareness of the
likely presence of prejudice.”135 We should, in other words, be especially
alert in circumstances where it seems more likely that prejudice, implicit bias,
hermeneutical gaps, or other like malfunctions are in play and are the tail
wagging the dismissal dog. Deliberative scarcity can justify not considering
every claim in the aggregate, but it cannot justify the motivational slant that
makes dismissal so dangerous—and dismissing discrimination so appealing.
IV. DISMISSING DISCRIMINATION
Dismissal is a pervasive phenomenon. It is a temptation that exists any
time one has a strong preference in favor of maintaining a given belief and
there are low costs to refusing to consider alternatives. This Part focuses on
the dismissal of discrimination claims as a particularly illustrative example.
Its target is not exclusively legal discrimination claims, though it is notable
that such claims fare notoriously poorly in the courts,136 and it suggests that
“dismissal” can explain some judicial reticence around expanding legal

133
134

135

136

See supra notes 61–62, 91 and accompanying text.
See YOUNG, supra note 122, at 136–46. Young’s analysis of the concept of “perspective”—which
focuses on the fact that people are “differently positioned” and therefore “have different experience,
history, and social knowledge derived from that positioning,” is informative. Id. at 136. Particularly
relevant is her observation that perspective places the focus on what helps create the set of questions
and assumptions from which we begin to reason, rather than the specific content that we ultimately
arrive at once the deliberative process concludes. Id. at 137–39.
FRICKER, supra note 3, at 91 (“When the hearer suspects prejudice in her credibility judgment . . .
she should shift intellectual gear out of spontaneous, unreflective mode and into active critical
reflection in order to identify how far the suspected prejudice has influenced her judgment.”).
See, e.g., SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017); Quintanilla, supra note 40; Victor D. Quintanilla,
Beyond Common Sense: A Social-Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
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discrimination protections.137 But the legal treatment of discrimination is
situated within a broader deliberative ecosystem that also attends to how we
respond to such claims socially and politically—rhetorical maneuvers and
political justifications standing alongside formalized doctrine.138
Discrimination is an evocative case of discursive dismissal for several
reasons. To begin, the psychological literature exploring how people
maintain prejudiced belief structures is particularly robust and easy to
grapple with. More importantly, discrimination claims provide a familiar
example of dismissal in practice: charging claimants with “playing the race
card.” The “race card” response (or its equivalents as applied to other forms
of discrimination) is a means of declaring that the discrimination claim has
been leveled in bad faith; hence, the discussion need not proceed any further.
In this way, allegations of racism, sexism, antisemitism, and the like are
routinely brushed aside as implausible on their face.
After providing a brief sketch of the familiar “race card” response as an
example of dismissal, this Part provides an account of its utility under an
aversive racism model. It then explains how persons construct the meaning
of “discrimination” in ways which normalize its dismissal, even as they
purport to affirm the serious moral wrongfulness of engaging in identitybased prejudice. Two mechanisms—heightening the “seriousness” of a
discrimination charge in order to reduce its scope, and hinging a valid finding
of discrimination on the existence of conscious, volitional discriminatory
intent—are well-entrenched in legal and social argument and do much to
facilitate dismissing discrimination in both domains.
A. “The Race Card” and Other Methods of Dismissing Discrimination
A common, even ubiquitous, response to claims of discrimination is to
assert that they have been leveled in bad faith. In the context of race relations
this challenge usually means accusing the claimant of “playing the race
card”; that is, alleging that they brought up the prospect of racial
discrimination not because of “a credible (or perhaps even sincere) belief that
unfair or unequal treatment has occurred,” but rather merely as a ploy to
illicitly gain public sympathy or private reward.139 Constructed in this way,
the racism charge can be reasonably dismissed—one need not spend time
grappling with an obviously incredible or dishonest argument. Recognizing
137
138
139

See infra notes 193–214.
See BELL, supra note 83, at 111 (using the metaphor of legal standing to attack the practice “in the
world generally” of declining to accord legitimacy to Black perspectives regarding race).
See Schraub, supra note 78, at 285.
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this problem, scholars have sought to present evidence of discrimination
in ways that they think will evade the “race card” riposte and
demand substantive engagement.140 These efforts have generally been
unsuccessful.141
As David Wilkins observes, the “race card” objection is a pervasive retort
that can be used to dismiss virtually any racially inflected topic of
conversation.142 For example, conservative critics rapidly deployed this trope
against President Barack Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder for even
relatively mild acknowledgements of the intersection between race and police
violence. Holder’s statement that “I understand that mistrust” that many
people of color harbor towards the police,143 and his affirmation that
“President Obama is keenly interested in how majority white police
departments in communities like Ferguson treat black youths,” led to the
furious headline “Obama Administration Plays Race Card in Ferguson.”144
Rep. Steve King, a Republican from Iowa, said that Ferguson was being
beset upon by “race hustlers” seeking to “monetize” the tragedy. Among
this group he included the President, the Attorney General, St. Louis-area
Representative William Lacy Clay, and the Congressional Black Caucus.
With respect to the latter, King contended that “they’re always looking to
place the race card. They’re always looking to divide people down that line.

140
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See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1117 (2006) (“Unwarranted discrimination exists here and now: it can be
documented through scientific methods that cannot be dismissed as hyperbole or playing the ‘race
card.’”); Rachel Lyon, Media, Race, Crime, and Punishment: Re-Framing Stereotypes In Crime and Human
Rights Issues, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 758 (2009) (“With an African American in the White House,
the ‘issue’ of having a skewed, racialized justice system is more likely to be addressed, or at least not
dismissed as ‘the race card.’”).
See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J.
279, 341 (1997) (“Experience has shown that preconceptions about discrimination are remarkably
resilient to empirical proof.”); Camille A. Nelson, Racial Paradox and Eclipse: Obama as a Balm for What
Ails Us, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 743, 769 (2009) (quoting Geraldine Ferraro as complaining that
“Obama’s playing the race card throughout the campaign and no one [is] calling him for it”).
David B. Wilkins, The New Social Engineers in the Age of Obama: Black Corporate Lawyers and the Making of
the First Black President, 53 HOW. L.J. 557, 636 (2010) (observing that “any attempt to discuss race—
no matter how justified or accurate—is too often dismissed as ‘playing the race card’”).
See Arit John, Eric Holder Almost Gives the Ferguson Race Speech Obama Couldn’t, YAHOO! News
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/eric-holder-almost-gives-ferguson-race-speech-obama-2
15409787.html.
Obama Administration Plays Race Card in Ferguson, JUDICIAL WATCH (Aug. 22, 2014),
http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/weekly-updates/obama-administration-plays-race-car
d-ferguson/.
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And I have friends in that caucus. I get along with them personally, but their
agenda is to play the race card.”145
Absent from these contentions is any substantive reply to specific
allegations of racial injustice. They instead fulminate generally against the
facial illegitimacy of raising the issue at all, divorced entirely from the merits
or infirmities of particular claims or circumstances. Perhaps the apex of this
trope, then, was a 2009 column in which Peter Wehner preemptively
announced that, if President Obama’s poll numbers were to drop, “be
prepared for the ‘race card’ to be played.” And not only was Wehner sure
that racism charges would be made, he also could pass advance judgment on
their veracity: “the charges will be . . . transparently false.”146 Here was a
particularly naked articulation of the general practice: it is not specific
complaints of racism that are wrong (for specific reasons); all complaints of
racism, even those not yet made, can be assumed to be wrong because their
core characteristic is that they are deployed in bad faith.
While the “race card” trope is the most rhetorically familiar, similar
refrains can be easily found applied against other discrimination charges.
The video game industry, for example, was rocked by charges of endemic
sexism embodied by the experiences of critic Anita Sarkeesian. Sarkeesian,
whose web series ‘Tropes vs. Women in Video Games’ explored sexist
elements in prominent products, was subjected to a vicious series of attacks,
bomb threats, promises of rape, and a video game titled “Beat Up Anita
Sarkeesian.”147 Even still, some industry members held that Sarkeesian was
being dishonest in using the “trump card” of sexism.148 “Sexism,” columnist
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Tom Kludt, Steve King Goes Off About Ferguson and the Congressional Black Caucus, TALKING POINTS
MEMO (Aug. 21, 2014, 4:57 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/steve-king-fergusoncongressional-black-caucus.
Peter Wehner, Four Safe Bets about Obama, COMMENTARY (Jan. 30, 2009), https://www.commen
tarymagazine.com/american-society/four-safe-bets-about-obama/.
See Nina Liss-Schultz, This Woman Was Threatened With Rape After Calling Out Sexist Video Games—and
Then Something Inspiring Happened, MOTHER JONES (May 30, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/
media/2014/05/pop-culture-anita-sarkeesian-video-games-sexism-tropes-online-harassement-fe
minist (exploring the backlash against Anita Sarkeesian for highlighting the sexism in video games);
Soraya
Nadia
McDonald,
Gaming
Vlogger
Anita
Sarkeesian
is
Forced
from Home After Receiving Harrowing Death Threats, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2014, 5:23 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/29/gaming-vlogger-anitasarkeesian-is-forced-from-home-after-receiving-harrowing-death-threats/
(discussing
the
magnitude of threats against Sarkeesian, which forced her to call the police and leave her home).
Ryan Carroll, “Gamergate” is an Accountability Problem, Not a Sexism One, MODVIVE (Sept.
1, 2014), http://www.modvive.com/2014/09/01/gamergate-accountability-problem-sexism-one/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150904161911/http://www.modvive.com/2014/09/01/game
rgate-accountability-problem-sexism-one/] (criticizing the notion that threats against Sarkeesian
are sexist) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law).
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Ryan Carroll complained, “is a shortcut. An ‘I win’ button.”149 He argued
that “too often these words are used as accusations, as a way to shut
out opposing viewpoints. And eventually, these words will lose their
meaning.”150
Discourse about antisemitism moves to similar beats. After London
Mayor Ken Livingstone called a Jewish newspaper reporter a “German war
criminal” and likened him to a “concentration camp guard,”151 he defiantly
refused to apologize because “[f]or far too long the accusation of antisemitism has been used against anyone who is critical of the policies of the
Israeli government.”152 Even though the exchange with the Jewish reporter
was not actually related to Israel (Livingstone was angry that the reporter had
sought to interview him following a party), he in effect contended that the
allegation of antisemitism in any context should be presumed to be a
backdoor effort to stifle criticism of Israeli policies.153 This assertion—that
“antisemitism” typically is forwarded as a bad-faith smokescreen targeting
critics of Israel—has become such a ubiquitous means of dismissing
antisemitism allegations that it has become known as ‘The Livingstone
Formulation.’154
Nor, unfortunately, is this mode of response limited to crass columnists
or rough politicians. No less of an eminent authority that Jürgen Habermas
has indulged in a similar theme. Reacting to an essay by Peter Goodrich
which criticized Habermas “for elaborating a notion of the ideal speech
situation that was not inclusive of Talmudic or other diasporic or outsider
traditions,”155 Habermas declared, “I quit reading Goodrich’s essay at the
place where, vaguely referring to my Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, he
accused me of defending modernity ‘against the irrationalists, the
conservatives, the postmodernists, the heretics, the nomads and the outsiders,
the jews.’ Anyone who suspects me of antisemitism hardly expects a response
149
150
151

152
153
154

155

Id. Unprompted, Carroll also hastened to add that “the same goes for racism.” Id.
Id. (analogizing Sarkeesian to the “boy who cried wolf”).
Hugh Muir, Livingstone Faces Inquiry Over Nazi Guard Jibe at Jewish Reporter, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 11, 2005, 8:25 PM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2005/feb/12/pressandpub
lishing.londonpolitics (internal citations omitted).
Ken Livingstone, An Attack on Voters’ Rights, GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2006, 3:29 AM EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/mar/01/society.london.
Id.
Hirsh, supra note 88, at 91 (“It is a rhetorical device that enables the user to refuse to engage with
the charge made, a mirror that bounces back a counter-charge of dishonest Jewish (or ‘Zionist’)
conspiracy to a charge of antisemitism.”); see also DAVID HIRSH, CONTEMPORARY LEFT
ANTISEMITISM 11–39 (2018) (discussing the Livingstone Formulation).
Peter Goodrich, Europe in America: Grammatology, Legal Studies, and the Politics of
Transmission, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 2033, 2063 (2001).
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. . . .”156 And indeed, that was that—“[t]hat is all he says. This puts an end
to conversation”—even though Goodrich denied that he was calling
Habermas antisemitic at all.157
What draws these examples together? All of them react to specific (or
anticipated) claims of discriminatory behavior. And clearly, they evince
disagreement with the underlying substantive claims (of racism, sexism, or
antisemitism). But none of these statements addresses the charges on their
merits. Rather, they suggest that the very invocation of the issue in the first
place is illegitimate; an intentional effort to shut down conversation or
browbeat one’s opponents into submission. These qualities justify not a
refutation, but the failure to even attempt one.
The authors of these arguments are effectively arguing, not why the claim
is wrong, but why the claim can go unaddressed. The purported concern of
Black leaders over police violence was taken to be a smokescreen for more
illicit motives—publicity, popular appeal, or even profit. Carroll’s statement
presents a similar theme: for women to describe a constant barrage of rape
threats as “sexism” is in his view fundamentally dishonest. Allegations of
sexism are taken to be inherently suspect since they (supposedly) give women
an automatic “‘I win’ button” over ongoing social controversies. Likewise,
Mayor Livingstone’s comment is a general assertion that claims of
antisemitism should not be taken seriously, as they are merely tools “used”
to disparage those critical of Israel. And Habermas and Wehner present no
adornment at all—the former simply refused to accept the legitimacy of the
conversation once (he perceived) he was accused of antisemitism, the latter
preemptively announced that any prospective claim of racism during the
course of the Obama presidency would be “transparently false.”158
These assertions are not dependent on the specific substance of a
particular claim of prejudice or discrimination. They do not purport to
refute the claims on their merits; they do not tell us why calling a Jewish
reporter a Nazi is not antisemitic or why threatening to brutally assault a
woman is not misogynistic. Indeed, while they purport to be responsive to a
particular claim of racism, sexism, or antisemitism, they provide a much
wider-ranging indictment that encompasses and purports to problematize
racism, sexism, and antisemitism claims as a class. The particular content is
156
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158

Jürgen Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, in HABERMAS ON
LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 381, 382 n.7 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato
eds., 1998) (quoting Peter Goodrich, Habermas and the Postal Rule, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1457, 1458
(1996) (citations omitted)).
Goodrich, supra note 155, at 2063.
See supra notes 146–156 and accompanying text.
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irrelevant; in fact, each of the statements at issue above could be leveled
without knowing anything about the substance of the initial discrimination
claim.159
In short, the “card” response is primarily a form of dismissing
discrimination claims. Its purpose is not to illuminate the specific controversy
presented by the discrimination claimant, much less provide a substantive
refutation. Rather, it is to justify a decision to (in Habermas’ words) “quit
reading.” Presenting discrimination claims as a presumptively illegitimate
mode of argument, the “bad faith” or “card” response means that one can
evade having to actually reckon with the substantive merits of the claimants’
position.160
B. Why Dismiss Discrimination?
Beginning in the 1960s, psychologist Melvin Lerner began exploring the
idea of a “just-world hypothesis”—a general belief that the world is a fair
place where people get what they deserve.161 This belief is strongly
motivated, however, and when events transpire that suggest the appearance
of injustice—particularly widespread, ingrained, or systematic injustice—it is
often easier to recalibrate one’s understanding of justice than to admit the
existence of a very unjust world.162 The general belief that the world is a just
place colors social judgments, making people resistant to inferences of
injustice.163
159
160
161

162
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See Schraub, supra note 78, at 287–88.
See supra notes 146–156 and accompanying text.
See Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observer’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”: Compassion or
Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1966) (discussing the results of study which
found observers of a suffering victim will reject and devalue that victim in order to satisfy the
“observers’ need to believe in a just world”); see also Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame
Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (2006)
(“Lerner’s results powerfully illustrate two ways in which individuals cope when witnessing
suffering: we stop the injustice, or we justify it by conceiving of the victim as a person who actually
‘deserves’ to suffer.”); Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution Process:
Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030, 1031–32 (1978) (analyzing Lerner’s just world
hypothesis test and stating that the findings have been replicated with “diverse populations”).
See Hanson & Hanson, supra note 161, at 420 (“[I]t is not justice that we crave so much as the perception
of justice. And that craving can often be satisfied far more easily by changing our perception of the
victims than by acknowledging and addressing the underlying unfairness.” (emphasis in original)).
See Melvin J. Lerner, The Justice Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How They Lost It, and Why
They May Not Find It Again, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 388, 388 (2003) (“[T]he ‘just
world’ research indicated that the desire to believe that people get what they deserve influences . . .
social judgments . . . . ” (citations omitted)); Robbie M. Sutton & Karen M. Douglas, Justice for All,
or Just for Me? More Evidence of the Importance of the Self-Other Distinction in Just-World Beliefs, 39
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 637, 638 (2005) (observing that the benefits of just
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Obviously, a claim of discrimination is a claim of injustice and therefore
a threat to the belief in a just world. Such claims rest uncomfortably with
dominant sentiments characterizing social inequality as rare, aberrational, or
a thing of the past. Considerable survey evidence suggests that White people
are quite committed to the belief that racial inequities are a minimal feature
of contemporary American life.164 This belief makes perfect sense from a
motivational standpoint—believing that racism retains considerable potency
suggests that the current social position of White people may be undeserved,
whereas concluding that racism has disappeared functionally ratifies any
tangible advantages White persons possess as the product of merit or desert.
But the more one hears allegations of ongoing racial injustice, the harder it
is to ignore the possibility that such injustices are more than the rare
exception.165
Consequently, the ability to systematically dismiss
discrimination claims as frivolous, insincere, misguided, or made in bad faith
dissipates the threat posed by such claims and allows the broader belief in
social egalitarianism to proceed unimpaired.166
While this “just world” account would explain the propensity to dismiss
any account of widespread or systematic injustice, discrimination discourse
has particular characteristics which make dismissal especially appealing.

164

165

166

world theory “motivate individuals to defend it against contradictory evidence, thereby minimising
the injustices they see happening to others”).
See, e.g., Dan Balz & Scott Clement, On Racial Issues, America is Divided Both Black and White and Red and
Blue, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-racial-issuesamerica-is-divided-both-black-and-white-and-red-and-blue/2014/12/26/3d2964c8-8d12-11e4a085-34e9b9f09a58_story.html (relaying polls showing wide disparities between white and nonwhite perceptions of the criminal justice system); Lindsey Cook, Blacks and Whites See Race Issues
Differently, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 15, 2014, 3:14 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/datamine/2014/12/15/blacks-and-whites-see-race-issues-differently (noting wide gaps in how Black
people and White people assess racial equality in job, educational, and housing opportunities). As
this Article went to press, the police killing of George Floyd and high-profile protests against other
instances of state violence against Black Americans have precipitated a significant shift in White
perspectives on the prevalence of racism. See Carrie Dann, Poll: More Voters Acknowledge Symptoms of
Racism
but
Disagree
about
its
Causes,
NBC
NEWS
(July
21,
2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/poll-more-voters-acknowledge-symptoms-rac
ism-disagree-about-its-causes-n1234363. But it is too early to tell whether this will translate into a
long-term change in attitudes, or whether White opinions on this subject will eventually regress
back to their historical mean.
See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96
MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1306 (2012) (“For obvious reasons, discrimination—particularly if it is
perceived to be common or systematic—calls into question the veracity of meritocratic belief
systems.”); cf. Schraub, supra note 18, at 402 (noting that while the system can characterize a few
situations where systematic injustice requires heightened judicial intervention as “isolated . . .
aberrations of an otherwise just system[,] [i]f there are too many, though, the entire foundation of
our constitutional democracy is called into question”).
See Schraub, supra note 78, at 290.
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Persons who hold inegalitarian beliefs often nonetheless consciously seek to
avoid expressing them. This may result because they feel external social
pressure to behave in a non-prejudiced fashion (though internally they do
not themselves endorse those values). But it also may occur because they
have genuine egalitarian commitments which motivate them to suppress
prejudiced beliefs or behaviors.167 Yet “unmanifested unconscious racist
feelings do not go away when rejected; rather, they are reformulated,
disguised, and adorned with trappings of logic and reason, in order to survive
the scrutiny of the conscious mind.”168
It is no revelation to say that race is an uncomfortable topic of discourse.
People often say they view race as a “minefield” or that one has to “walk on
eggshells” while discussing it.169 “Race is a tense terrain, where we often try
to hide crucial truths from ourselves”;170 it is “defined as an illegitimate topic
for conversation.”171 When persons are put in a position where they are
expected to directly confront and discuss discrimination claims, they often
evince exceptional anxiety, nervousness, anger, or fear.172 For example, in
the fall of 2014 The Daily Show filmed a segment where they interviewed fans
of the Washington Redskins football team who defended the name against
charges that it was a racial slur. During the initial stages of the interview, the
fans simply deflected the charge: “We kept telling him that we felt the name

167

168

169

170
171
172

See, e.g., Ziva Kunda & Steven J. Spencer, When Do Stereotypes Come to Mind and When Do
They Color Judgment? A Goal-Based Theoretical Framework for Stereotype Activation and
Application, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 522, 524 (2003) (“[M]otivation to avoid prejudice may stem from
an internally driven desire to maintain an egalitarian identity or from an externally driven desire to
comply with egalitarian social norms.” (citations omitted)); E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine,
Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL., 811, 812 (1998) (discussing the difference between internal and external motivations for
suppressing prejudiced behavior).
Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental
Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV.
937, 944 (1993) (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Attempting To Discuss Race in Business and Corporate Law Courses and Seminars,
77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 901, 905 (2003) (“Race and racism are complex issues that are perforated
with minefields that few Americans are able to negotiate.” (footnote omitted)); Jennifer L. Pierce,
“Racing for Innocence”: Whiteness, Corporate Culture, and the Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 26
QUALITATIVE SOC. 53, 60 (2003) (quoting a white attorney who felt he was “walking around on egg
shells” when speaking about race-related issues).
Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal, at x (1992).
Woody Doane, Rethinking Whiteness Studies, in WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF
RACISM 3, 13 (Ashley “Woody” Doane & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2003).
See DiAngelo, supra note 70, at 54 (describing how White persons faced with “racial stress” often
exhibit “a range of defensive moves” ranging from “anger, fear, and guilt” to simply “leaving the
stress-inducing situation”).
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honored Native Americans.”173 But several hours into the interview, the fans
were confronted by a group of Native American activists who contended that
the name was in fact racist and offensive. Placed in a situation where they
would be expected to hear and process genuine arguments from affected
persons regarding the potential racism of “Redskins,” the fans reacted with
extreme distress. One contended that “It was disingenuous. The Native
Americans accused me of things that were so wrong. I felt in danger. I didn’t
consent to that. I am going to be defamed.”174 She stormed out of the room
and attempted to file a police report. Another fan was upset because he
claimed the producers had assured him there would not be “a cross-panel
discussion” with the Native Americans.175 While he understood that Native
American participants would contribute to the Daily Show segment, he did
not expect that he would have to confront their argument on a personal
level.176
This is a particularly striking example of a presumably uncontroversial
point: being implicated in a claim of discrimination is uncomfortable. Being
forced to defend oneself against such a claim is even more uncomfortable.
Claims of discrimination create dissonance between conscious selfconception (as non-racist) and others’ assertions regarding how one should
behave. The resultant anxiety creates a negative association surrounding
these sorts of interactions—we do not like the people who typically prompt
these feelings of agitation. This creates a feedback loop where negative
attitudes about the group are reinforced. Importantly, this negative appraisal
of the claimant does not depend on the claim being false—“legitimate claims
of racism also antagonize and alienate those who are accused.”177
Hence, when everyday persons consider how to think about race (or other
similar identities), they will favor conceptions that are “informative, but also
173

174
175
176

177

Ian Shapira, The Daily Show Springs Tense Showdown with Native Americans on Redskins Fans, WASH. POST
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-daily-show-springs-showdown-withnative-americans-on-redskins-fans/2014/09/19/c6c5f936-3f73-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.h
tml.
Id.
Id.
After years of pressure, the Washington team announced in 2020 that the name would be retired.
As this article went to press the new name has not yet been selected. See Les Carpenter,
Washington’s NFL Team to Retire Redskins Name, Following Sponsor Pressure and Calls for Change, WASH.
POST (July 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/07/13/redskins-changename-announcement/
Julie C. Suk, Race Without Cards?, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 111, 116 (2009) (reviewing FORD, infra
note 182). This antagonism can result even in the clearest of cases. See Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating
the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 601, 626 n.89 (1999) (citing a Swiss Government report which
“found that anti-Semitism in Switzerland had grown as a result of the claims made against the Swiss
banks and other Swiss institutions by World War II Jewish survivors”).
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nonthreatening.”178 The ultimate goal underlying most people’s theories of
racism is to “allow them to maintain a safe distance from any appearance of
personal bias.”179 Dismissal is one mechanism creating such “safe
distance”—if a claim of bias can be brushed off as inherently ridiculous, then
no more work needs to be done to reinforce the preferred unbiased image of
the self.
C. How Discrimination is Dismissed
The “card” retort provides the paradigm case of dismissal, and the
previous section demonstrates why that response is so valuable. But what
specific rationales do people use to justify dismissing discrimination?
Sometimes, the rationale is predicated on explicit statements deriding the
credibility of the affected group as epistemic agents—these claims are just
what you would expect from those people.180 Such portrayals were discussed
above as cases of testimonial injustice, wherein bias against the speaker
prevents their discursive contributions from receiving due consideration.181
But often the rationale actually relies on hidden normative appraisals about
what discrimination does and does not entail that render wide swathes of
claims either unintelligible or superficially implausible. The problem is not
with the appraisals themselves (though they might have problems); so long as
persons adopting these appraisals are willing to engage in a meta-debate
about their validity, the issue is not one of dismissal. But frequently they are
not, and instead these particular and contestable understandings of
discrimination are wielded as a tool to avoid having a substantive
conversation about the merits of the particular claim.
1. Heightened Seriousness, Reduced Scope
One common objection registered against discrimination claims is that
they seek to exploit the moral seriousness of discrimination—the grave
178
179
180

181

Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About White Racists: What Constitutes Racism
(and What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PROCESS & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 119 (2006).
Id.
For example, Caryl Churchill dismissed Howard Jacobson’s contention that her play, Seven Jewish
Children, was antisemitic by calling that claim, “the usual tactic.” Caryl Churchill, My Play Is Not
Anti-Semitic, in Letters: Jacobson on Gaza, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 21, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.ind
ependent.co.uk/voices/letters/letters-jacobson-on-gaza-1628191.html (responding to Howard
Jacobson,
Opinion,
Let’s
See
the
‘Criticism’
of
Israel
for
What
It
Really Is, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 18, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comme
ntators/howard-jacobson/howard-jacobson-letrsquos-see-the-criticism-of-israel-for-what-it-reallyis-1624827.html).
See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
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wrongfulness of racism, sexism, antisemitism, etc.—for wrongs which are far
more mundane. For example, Richard Thompson Ford contends that
claims of racial bias or prejudice can be an illegitimate argumentative tactic
because they unfairly summon the specter of an extreme evil—conscious,
malign racial antipathy of the form associated with the Jim Crow South—
and attribute it willy-nilly to contemporary persons who almost certainly lack
such an attitude.182
I have suggested before that there may be an inverse correlation between
how people perceive the “severity” of a norm (how wrong is racial
discrimination?) and its “scope” (what behaviors are encompassed under the
ambit of “racial discrimination”).183 For example, if “discrimination” means
something as egregiously terrible as Jim Crow America, then people will be
reticent to include relatively commonplace or ambiguous situations under
the term’s domain. The practice of dismissal suggests that this dynamic can
be deliberately harnessed for tactical ends. By framing the charge of
discrimination in severe terms, it can be waved aside as inherently ridiculous
when applied to anything but the most overt and uncontroversial instances
of the wrong.184 This, in turn, allows one to evade considering other, more
realistic potential connections between everyday challenged conduct and
racial wrongdoing.
In this light, it is notable that the charge of “playing the race card” is not
leveled only against claims of overt, conscious racial hostility. Indeed, one of
the more interesting facets of “race card” discourse is how it is deployed even
where the initial claimant seems to accept that the target is not the modernday incarnate of George Wallace.185 Many articulations of racism seek not
182

183

184
185

See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE
RELATIONS WORSE 58–59 (2008). Ford’s argument is essentially one of the “persuasive
definition,” first articulated by Charles Stevenson, wherein people capitalize on the emotive content
of a particular term (like “racism”) while altering its conceptual content to fit a new substantive
agenda. See generally Charles Leslie Stevenson, Persuasive Definitions, 47 MIND 331, 331 (1938)
(showing that “[a] persuasive definition[,] . . . which gives a new conceptual meaning to a familiar
word without substantially changing its emotive meaning,” can lead to important philosophical
confusions when there is widespread failure to recognize these definitions as persuasive definitions,
which can be analogized to racism (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g., Schraub, supra note 78, at 290 (hypothesizing that “there is an inverse relationship between
how people perceive the severity of an ambiguous norm and how they perceive its scope”); Schraub,
supra note 70, at 1300–01 (showing that opposing racism has become a universal moral norm but
there is not a universal understanding or definition of racism).
See, e.g., Schraub, supra note 78, at 291.
See Suk, supra note 177, at 117 (using the 2008 U.S. presidential election as an example of
inadvertent racial hostility—noting that then-Senator Obama accused McCain of igniting
“Americans’ subconscious fear of electing the nation’s first black president,” which McCain in turn
described as playing the race card).
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to uncover cases of extreme evil but rather ordinary failures of the sort that
it is perfectly reasonable to associate with normal individuals. Yet persons
respond to these relatively mundane claims of racial injustice by converting
them into extraordinary declarations about the depraved hearts of everyday
Americans. Doing so allows the respondent to then pivot to an aggrieved
protest against the extreme and disproportionate charge that so obviously
outstrips whatever minor misstep may have been made.
The conservative response to the Obama Administration’s statements on
Ferguson are keenly illustrative—despite the relatively measured character
of the latter, they were quickly reframed as extraordinary declarations of
widespread culpability in a deliberate project of racist domination.186
Indeed, the allure of the “‘race card’ card” is such that it emerges even when
the declarants do not mention race at all. For example, when Eric Holder
complained about uncivil attacks against himself and the President (without
mentioning race), Washington Post columnist Kathleen Parker saw through the
ruse: “True, Holder didn’t say anything specifically racial — he’s far too
smart for that — but aren’t we too smart to believe race isn’t what he
meant?”187 She inferred that Holder was calling his critics racial bigots so
that she could airily dismiss the insinuation that his critics were racial bigots.
In discussions over sexual violence, this dynamic is if anything even more
pronounced. As Kate Manne writes: “We assure ourselves that real rapists
will appear on our radars either as devils, decked out with horns and
pitchforks, or else as monsters—that is, as creepy and ghoulish creatures.
Monsters are unintelligible, uncanny, and they are outwardly frightening.”188
But, she continues, what is actually “frightening about rapists is partly the
lack of identifying marks and features, beyond the fact that they are by far
more likely to be men. Rapists are human, all too human, and they are very
much among us. The idea of rapists as monsters exonerates by
caricature.”189
In her book, Real Rape, Susan Estrich says that “the law’s abhorrence of
the rapist in stranger cases . . . has been matched only by its distrust of the
victim who claims to have been raped by a friend or neighbor or
acquaintance.”190 But it is more than just a match: the abhorrence is what

186
187

188
189
190

See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.
Kathleen Parker, Erasing the Race Card, WASH. POST (April 15, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/opinions/kathleen-parker-erasing-the-race-card/2014/04/15/5d774e9e-c4da-11e3-b1
95-dd0c1174052c_story.html.
Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny 199 (2017).
Id.
Susan Estrich, Real Rape 4 (1987).
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constitutes the mistrust. The abhorrence of rape is, in a real sense, what
allows or even demands the mistrust of the vast majority of rape victims. It
is for this reason that men who have a stake in contesting an accusation of
rape, or in opposing an expansion of laws criminalizing sexual assault, will
often be the most invested in declaring that such crimes represent “serious
accusations.”191 Rape, they tell us quite earnestly, is a monstrous crime. And
as a monstrous crime, it cannot apply in circumstances that feel distinctively
human and recognizable—or committed by persons who are occupying
positions and inhabit identities that seem normally human. This discourse
focuses obsessively on cases involving “grey areas”—supposedly unclear
signals, the “mature for her age” minor under the age of consent,
intoxication, cases where no force was used, seduction versus coercion, and
the line between “mere” unenthusiasm and explicit lack of consent. These
are cases involving perpetrators who present more complicated postures than
unbridled, violent, bestial lust. Their conduct is presented as judgment calls
where one can imagine ordinary individuals—not abhorrent, not
monstrous—falling on the wrong side of the line. But rape’s abhorrent
character goes hand-in-hand with its aberrational status—the conceptual
boundaries of rape and sexual violence are delineated precisely by that which
is not ordinary or a matter of “judgment.”
The problem is that once you shear off all the cases that are plausibly
“ordinary,” you have written out the vast majority of rape cases. At that
point, “rape” cannot do any more than idiosyncratic work. All the cases of
sexual violence which fall outside of the most stereotypically monstrous
form—date rape, spousal rape, cases involving intoxication, cases that lack
outward markers of physical force or resistance—will systematically be
excluded from the term. And that exclusion is no accident—it is functional,
a mechanism of ensuring that many if not most cases of sexual violence and
exploitation are rendered unnamable and immunized from most forms of
social (to say nothing of legal) redress. Manne therefore states bluntly: “That
misogynist violence and sexual assault are generally perpetrated by

191

See, e.g., Chris Huffman, Opinion, The Dangers of False Allegations, CROOKSTON TIMES (Oct. 25,
2018, 10:49 AM), https://www.crookstontimes.com/opinion/20181025/letter-dangers-of-falseallegations (“You see, rape is a serious matter. Not only is it a crime, but it is life destroying and
morally destitute. Accusing someone of this, particularly in a small community, can destroy a
reputation.”); Peter Wood, The Meaning of Sex, WEEKLY STANDARD (May 4, 2015, 12:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-meaning-of-sex (“Let me repeat:
Actual rape is a serious crime which calls for the serious response of law enforcement. The gravity
of that crime, however, is obscured by rhetoric that treats other kinds of sexual encounters as though
they were rape.”).
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unremarkable, non-monstrous-seeming people must be accepted if things are
to improve in this arena . . . .”192
This strategy—elevating the moral seriousness of discrimination claims
as a defensive move to delegitimize their applicability in specific cases—has
also found a home in the judiciary’s interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, for example, the Supreme
Court addressed whether classifications discriminating against the disabled
should receive heightened judicial scrutiny (akin to that provided for racial
or gender classifications).193 The Court expressed concern that providing
such protections to the disabled would make it “difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups” which desired similar
protections, e.g., “the aging, . . . the mentally ill, and the infirm.”194 Granting
that the disabled do suffer from at least some degree of political powerlessness
and prejudice, the Court nonetheless fretted that “much economic and social
legislation would [also] be suspect” under any rationale which could justify
heightened protection in this case.195 In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court faced a
similar dilemma when presented with rigorous statistical evidence
demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of capital punishment.196
Noting that similar arguments could be made against the entire project of
criminal sentencing, the Court refused to consider the defendant’s argument
that aggregate proof of discriminatory application was a rationale for
reversing his death sentence.197 Allowing a sentence to be overturned
because of general statistical proof of discriminatory practice “throws into
serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice
system”198—a position the dissent characterized as “a fear of too much
justice.”199
To be clear, there are legitimate reasons for the judiciary to tread lightly
when it elects to substitute its own judgment for those of democratically
accountable bodies.200 Kenji Yoshino is undoubtedly correct that there are
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

MANNE, supra note 188, at 211.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 445–46.
Id. at 445.
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Id. at 314–15.
Id.
Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
This rationale has stronger force in the Cleburne tiered-scrutiny context, where the courts are
determining whether to invalidate legislative classifications, than in the McCleskey criminal law
context. Disparities in sentencing, at least when not the product of legislatively-enacted sentencing
ranges, are largely endogenous to the judiciary and thus do not substantially implicate democratic
legitimacy problems.
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practical limits to the number of instances where courts can aggressively
intervene in democratic policymaking.201 But his precise choice of verbiage
is interesting: “the Court can never give heightened scrutiny to classifications
of, say, twenty groups without diluting the meaning of that scrutiny.”202 The
verb “diluting” is a suggestive choice: serious problems must be scarce; if the
judiciary intervenes too often, it necessarily implies that the problems it is
attacking are not particularly dangerous.
Perhaps the most striking examples of this dynamic can be found in the
gay marriage context. In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Windsor,203
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that same-sex marriage bans had long
been thought to be “essential” to the definition of marriage and that the
Defense of Marriage Act enjoyed wide support in Congress (earning 342
votes in the House and 85 in the Senate, not to mention the President’s
signature).204 These factors should have made the Court reticent to “tar the
political branches with the brush of bigotry.”205 Justice Alito registered the
same complaint: the plaintiffs in Windsor “ask us to rule that the presence of
two members of the opposite sex is as rationally related to marriage as white
skin is to voting or a Y-chromosome is to the ability to administer an
estate. . . . Acceptance of the argument would cast all those who cling to
traditional beliefs about the nature of marriage in the role of bigots or
superstitious fools.”206
Judge Jeffrey Sutton’s opinion in DeBoer v. Snyder might be the most
devoted to the theme.207 DeBoer was the first federal appellate opinion after
Windsor to uphold a state gay marriage ban,208 and Judge Sutton focused on
the commonality of anti-gay marriage sentiment as a reason to reject a
constitutional finding of animus. He noted the history: the laws simply
“codified a long-existing, widely held social norm already reflected in state
law.”209 He relied on raw numbers: “The number of people who supported
201
202
203
204
205

206
207
208
209

Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 762 (2011)
Id.
570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down portions of the Defense of Marriage Act).
Id. at 776 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. Chief Justice Roberts returned to this theme when objecting to the majority’s due process
analysis in Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014) (“It is demeaning to the democratic process to
presume that voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational
grounds.”)).
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 813 (Alito, J., dissenting).
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
See Erik Eckholm, Court Upholds Marriage Bans in Four States, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/us/appeals-court-upholds-same-sex-marriage-ban.html.
DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 408.
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each initiative—Michigan (2.7 million), Kentucky (1.2 million), Ohio (3.3
million), and Tennessee (1.4 million)—was large and surely diverse.”210 And
he explicitly blurred those facts regarding commonality with a normative
assessment of the enactor’s motives: “[T]he decision to place the definition
of marriage in a State’s constitution [was not] unusual, nor did it otherwise
convey the kind of malice or unthinking prejudice the Constitution prohibits.
Nineteen States did the same thing during that period.”211 Given the breadth
of support, Judge Sutton concluded, it would be “unfair to paint the
proponents of the measures as a monolithic group of hate-mongers.”212
All three judges are making a similar rhetorical move—actually, two
rhetorical moves. On the one hand, they elevate the moral seriousness of a
decision to strike down gay marriage bans—it entails, they say, labeling gay
marriage opponents “bigots,” “irrational,” and “hate-mongers.” On the
other hand, they observe that opposition to gay marriage has been the norm
throughout most of American history and still enjoys considerable support
today. They suggest that it is implausible to assert that such large quantities
of Americans can justly be described in such vitriolic terms.213 One
immediately senses the trap: if declaring a law unconstitutional as an equalprotection violation means “tar[ring] the political branches with the brush of
bigotry,”214 and it is implausible to declare that wide swaths of Americans are
bigoted, then it follows that nothing (or at least, nothing outside of truly
idiosyncratic local enactments) is an equal-protection violation.
It is therefore unsurprising that only those supporting the
constitutionality of bans on gay marriage—such as the dissenters in Windsor
and the majority in DeBoer—ever use the words “bigot” or “hate-monger” to
characterize gay-marriage opponents.215 Framing the expressive content of
a validated claim of legal discrimination in such explosive terms is a defensive
move meant to weaken the intuitive plausibility of the claim. To support an
equal-protection violation is to be a moral monster, it is implausible that
210
211
212
213

214
215

Id. at 409.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 410.
Cf. George Tsai, An Error Theory for Liberal Universalism, 21 J. POL. PHIL. 305, 311 (2013) (contending
that moral explanations which rely on believing that virtually everyone is “stupid or wicked or
something along those lines” just “lack[] the ring of truth”).
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 776 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 813 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that according heightened scrutiny to laws which
restrict marriage to heterosexual couples “cast all those who cling to traditional beliefs about the
nature of marriage in the role of bigots or superstitious fools”); DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 410 (“It is . . .
unfair to paint the proponents of the measures as a monolithic group of hate-mongers.”);
Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 361 (N.Y. 2006) (“A court should not lightly conclude that
everyone who held this belief [against gay marriage] was irrational, ignorant or bigoted.”).
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many Americans are monstrous, hence, an equal-protection claim
challenging widely supported conduct is inherently implausible and can be
rejected.216
This argument has resonance outside of the courts as well. For example,
some have urged that claims of discrimination be made only in the most
clear-cut cases, so as not to exhaust the patience of the broader
community.217 Ford worries that:
The good-natured humanitarian who listens attentively to the first claim
of social injustice will become an impatient curmudgeon after multiple
similar admonishments. . . . The growing number of social groups making
claims to civil rights protection threatens the political and practical viability
of civil rights for those who need them most.218
Latent in this concern is the belief that presenting discrimination as a
regular facet of life—something that exists in normal or ambiguous situations
and not just obvious forms of rabid hatred—is to discount its seriousness.219
This belief justifies preemptively dismissing many discrimination claims that
are not overt or unambiguous on both definitional and tactical grounds. In
this way, the very rhetoric that seems to take discrimination claims
“seriously”—viewing them as exceedingly grave violations of the norms of
democratic life—acts to insulate many such cases from substantive public
review.

216
217

218
219

See Schraub, supra note 78, at 290.
See, e.g., FORD, supra note 182, at 339 (worrying that if too many believe that the “serious charge of
racism has become a ploy used for undeserved advantage, the antiracist goodwill we currently enjoy
may give way to a pervasive attitude of cynical indifference”); STEPHEN WALT & JOHN
MEARSHEIMER, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 196 (2007) (claiming that the
“blurring” of “true anti-Semitism . . . makes it harder to fight true bigotry”); Peter Wallsten, Center
for American Progress, Group Tied to Obama, Under Fire from Israel Advocates, WASH. POST
(Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/center-for-america-progress-grouptied-to-obama-accused-of-anti-semitic-language/2012/01/17/gIQAcrHXAQ_story.html
(quoting J Street President Jeremy Ben-Ami as urging Jews to “tread lightly” around accusations of
antisemitism because otherwise “people won’t take you seriously”).
FORD, supra note 182, at 176.
From another angle, David Oppenheimer promotes his concept of “negligent discrimination”
precisely because it detaches the concept of “discrimination” from one of “moral wrongfulness”
and therefore expands the class of cases where a victim of discrimination can gain redress. David
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 970–71 (1992); see also
Freeman, supra note 20, at 1052–53 (distinguishing between the “victim” perspective on antidiscrimination law, which focuses on the material conditions experienced by members of the
underclass, and the “perpetrator” perspective, which focuses on the inappropriate conduct of those
accused of engaging in illegitimate discrimination).
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2. Intentionality and Epistemic Privilege
One wide-spread understanding of “discrimination” is that an action is
discriminatory if and only if it results from conscious and intentional bias
against a particular group.220 In law, this conception is operationalized as a
requirement of discriminatory intent: a plaintiff alleging discrimination must
demonstrate that the alleged discriminator acted due to some sort of illicit
animus against a protected identity characteristic.221 The intentionality
requirement can and has been criticized for being unduly narrow—failing to
include both implicit biases that commonly characterize aversive racism as
well as structural barriers to equality that minority members might face.222
There is, however, a less-recognized role this definition plays in enabling the
dismissal of discrimination claims. By placing the key facts underlying a
discrimination claim in the minds of those accused, this understanding of
discrimination places the respondents in an epistemically privileged position
vis-à-vis the claimant.
“Epistemic privilege” generally refers to the claim that certain individuals
possess a particular standpoint which is not just different but advantageous
vis-à-vis other perspectives on reality.223 The enlightenment model accorded
220

221

222

223

See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 477, 480 (2007) (critiquing a “narrow” view “that treats discrimination as a wrong perpetrated
by a discriminator who acts self-consciously and irrationally”); Eyer, supra note 165, at 1300
(“Perhaps the most striking finding of psychology scholars . . . is that the intent of the perpetrator is
a critical determinant of observers’ willingness to make attributions to discrimination.”); FORD,
supra note 182, at 180 (“Most people think unlawful discrimination is a decision motivated by animus
or bias”).
See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”); Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979) (concluding that a governmental action must be taken “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite
of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group” to constitute an equal protection violation).
See Freeman, supra note 20, at 1054–55 (arguing that the focus on identifying a discrete perpetrator
harboring discriminatory animus is predicated on a need to declare most actors “innocent” and
thus not liable for bearing the burden of rectifying allegedly discriminatory conduct); Oppenheimer,
supra note 219, at 916 (“If whites are frequently unaware of their own racism, a theory of
employment discrimination that focuses on an intent to discriminate provides no remedy for most
discrimination.”).
See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING FROM
WOMEN’S LIVES 121 (1991) (asserting that marginalized persons will typically carry a standpoint
which is “less partial and less distorted” than competing social outlooks); Eric Blumenson, Mapping
the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 523, 556 (1996) (“Arguably, those on the
bottom might possess an epistemic privilege resulting from a kind of dual vision: They are able to
compare prevailing, legitimating ideologies with the realities of their lives, and thereby reveal
injustices that would otherwise remain invisible to others.”). For a skeptical, albeit sympathetic,
view, see Bat-Ami Bar On, Marginality and Epistemic Privilege, in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES 83
(Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993).
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epistemic privilege as a class to persons with formal academic training, who
utilize the scientific method, and who in general stand as objective,
“unmarked” observers.224 Feminist philosophers turned this model on its
head and asserted that oppressed persons occupied an epistemically
privileged position because (among other reasons) they could draw on both
their social knowledge of pervasive dominant norms as well as their personal
(but socially-suppressed) knowledge derived from their experience as
oppressed.225 Others express skepticism regarding whether any group of
persons should be considered to possess epistemic privilege as a general
matter.226
But whether or not we believe that there is a class of epistemically
privileged persons generally, it seems evident and inescapable that particular
models of understanding a given social phenomenon privilege the outlook of
certain people in certain situations. With respect to the question “what
emotion is Jane feeling right now,” Jane is in an epistemically privileged
position compared to most, if not all, other observers to articulate the right
answer.227 Certainly, this does not imply that Jane is generally epistemically
privileged in her response to any question—her authority stems instead from
the specific context governing how we observe, assess, and understand
emotions. Nor does this necessarily mean Jane’s vocalized response to the
question is unimpeachable—she may be lying. It does not even demand that
her (sincere) appraisal is correct—she might be confused. It is possible that
in some circumstances a trained therapist, given time and proper equipment,
could come up with a “better” answer to the question than Jane would.
Nonetheless, it is generally the case that Jane’s articulation of what Jane is
feeling will be given greater credence than competing opinions proffered by
others. Hence, if we believe that the decisive question governing the answer

224

225

226
227

See Marianne Janack, Standpoint Epistemology Without the “Standpoint”?: An Examination of Epistemic
Privilege and Epistemic Authority, 12 HYPATIA 125, 133–34 (1997) (“One is supposed to have epistemic
privilege . . . because of one’s knowledge situation.”); Bar On, supra note 223, at 85–88.
Janack, supra note 224, at 126 (concluding that “while theories developed by members of dominant
groups will reflect only the interests and values of those groups, theories developed by the oppressed
will encompass a broader array of interests and experiences”); see also Pohlhaus Jr., supra note 99, at
721 (asserting that “the epistemic resources developed from marginalized situatedness will be suited
to more of the experienced world in general” and such “marginally situated knowers . . . develop
epistemic resources more adequate for making sense of more parts of the experienced world”).
See Bar On, supra note 223, at 97.
See Donald Davidson, First Person Authority, 38 DIALECTICA 101, 101 (1984) (“When a speaker avers
that he has a belief, hope, desire or intention, there is a presumption that he is not mistaken . . . .”);
John Heil, Privileged Access, 97 MIND 238, 238 (1988) (“I know my own states of mind immediately
and with confidence. You may discover what I am thinking, of course, but you are liable to err in
your assessment of my thoughts in ways that I cannot.”).
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to a given moral controversy is “what emotion is Jane feeling,” then Jane is
an epistemically privileged position with respect to how we assess that
controversy. More broadly, the possession of epistemic privilege in any
particular case depends on what is believed to establish the truth of a
proposition as an initial matter in specific situations.228 A person in a
privileged position under one model may be viewed with suspicion and
mistrust under another.
The intentionalist model of discrimination is epistemically selfprivileging. By this I mean that, under the intentionalist model, whether an
action constitutes “discrimination” depends on information or appraisals
that the subject of the discrimination claim (the person who allegedly is acting
in a discriminatory fashion) is in a privileged position to be able to assess.
And an epistemically self-privileging theory of discrimination greatly enables
the practice of dismissal. David Hirsh describes the mechanics in
characteristically lucid fashion when discussing the dismissal of antisemitism
(though the logic applies to other “-ism” claims as well). Persons confronted
with the charge of antisemitism:
find it easier to look within themselves and to find they are not intentionally
antisemitic, indeed they are opponents of antisemitism. Intimate access to
the object of inquiry yields an apparently clear result and seems to make it
unnecessary for the antiracist to look any further . . . .229

Once it is “clear” that the label is false, it is perfectly reasonable to dismiss
the claim without additional consideration. What more do we need to know?
But this move assumes that a particular, narrow definition of antisemitism—
one confined to conscious antipathy towards Jews—occupies the field.230
Giving such a definition this type of pre-deliberative primacy is not the
conclusion of an open discussion but a gatekeeper standing athwart its
commencement.
Intentionalist theories of discrimination—whereby one only is implicated
in “discrimination” if that is one’s intention or purpose—hinge on
epistemically self-privileging factual assessments. To be sure, one could
argue the contrary—we might believe that people are unreliable appraisers
of their own mental states, particularly if we factor in subconscious
prejudices. Indeed, this potential counterargument may also explain the
228

229
230

See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND
THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 202–03 (1990) (“Epistemological choices about who to trust,
what to believe, and why something is true . . . . tap the fundamental question of which versions of
truth will prevail and shape thought and action.”).
Hirsh, supra note 88, at 91.
See id. (noting that this posture implicitly dismisses the possibility of antisemitism that exists beyond
individual conscious hostile attitudes).
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resistance to incorporating subconscious theories of discrimination—they
undermine one of the primary, if unstated, “advantages” of conscious
theories of discrimination (namely, that they put those accused of
discrimination in a position of epistemic privilege from where they can easily
dismiss the allegation).231
Nonetheless, the idea that “access to one’s own mental states is infallible
and incorrigible” runs deep and is easily accepted as a baseline
assumption.232 Having adopted this view, a discrimination claim easily be
brushed off—one hears the charge, quickly checks one’s own mental state,
and concludes that one is not harboring malign attitudes towards the
supposed victim. From that conclusion, it follows that the discrimination
claim is obviously unsubstantiated and can be dismissed. None of this
requires any sort of engagement with any evidence or argument the claimant
might otherwise bring to bear. This is preferable to relying on motivated
cognition because it is less cognitively taxing and eliminates the possibility
that sufficiently strong evidence will force them to admit the existence of
prejudice or discrimination.233 Through this mechanism, the theory is selfinsulating—since it is adopted because of its utility in avoiding critical
reflection regarding discrimination, it is implemented in such a way as to
negate the necessity of such reflection.
At one level, this method of dismissing discrimination claims might seem
to have less purchase in the courtroom, since third-party judges lack direct
access to the mental states of the alleged discriminator and so cannot rely on
them to dispose of claims.234 That is, it does them no good to look into their
own minds and judge themselves innocent, since they are judging someone
231

232

233

234

Compare Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1080 (2006) (challenging the validity of implicit bias measures because they
supposedly do not “tap[] into racial attitudes—at least attitudes in the commonsense view that the
attitudes imply an evaluative preference that, when brought to people’s attention, they endorse and
are even prepared to justify under appropriate conditions”), with R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L.
Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
1169, 1186–87 (2006) (noting that criticisms of implicit bias measures often rest on normative
disagreements regarding the meaning of discrimination rather than scientific objections).
Heil, supra note 227, at 238; see also Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions, and the Interpretation of Texts,
in MEANING & CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 68, at 76–77 (James Tully ed.,
1988) (“It is true that any agent is obviously in a privileged position when characterizing his own
intentions and actions. It follows that it must always be dangerous, and ought perhaps to be
unusual, for a critic to override a writer’s own explicit statements on this point.”).
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
1016, 1030 (1988) (suggesting that the requirement of conscious discriminatory intent exists so that
we can “reject[] civil rights claims that threaten . . . [White] psyches” (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted)).
See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text.
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else’s mindset. In practice, however, the intentionality requirement plays an
important role in enabling the early dismissal of discrimination cases.
For starters, sometimes judges can look into their own minds as a proxy
for the mindset of the alleged discriminator—if, for example, they have
engaged in similar conduct or spoken similar words as that which is alleged
to provide proof of discriminatory motive. Assuming, as seems likely, that
the judge does not view him or herself as harboring discriminatory animus,235
they will likewise be reticent to conclude that identical acts by another party
suffices to make out such proof.236
The gay marriage cases almost certainly provide an example.237 Several
of the conservative judges who voted against concluding that gay marriage
bans evinced anti-gay animus stressed how common sentiment opposing gay
marriage has been in the United States. That general demographic
observation makes it overwhelmingly likely that at least some of those judges
themselves opposed gay marriage, or at least did so in the recent past.
Nonetheless, those judges almost certainly did not conceive of themselves as
harboring discriminatory animus against LGBT persons by virtue of
adopting that position—that is, they can (or they think they can) use their
own experience as proof that an anti-gay motive is not a necessary condition
for opposing gay marriage. So when the plaintiffs argued that support for
such policies is properly attributed to unlawful animus, judges who
themselves have backed those laws could dismiss the inference—after all, the
judges have first-hand knowledge (under the intentionalist framework of
understanding discrimination, at least) that some proponents of gay marriage
bans are wholly innocent of the charge.
But even where there is not a direct parallel between the judge’s state of
mind and the defendant’s, there remains a more mundane problem: the

235

236

237

Cf. Laurie T. O'Brien, Christian S. Crandall, April Horstman‐Reser, Ruth Warner, AnGelica
Alsbrooks & Alison Blodorn, But I’m No Bigot: How Prejudiced White Americans Maintain Unprejudiced
Self‐Images, 40 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (2010) (exploring the “paradox” of how White Americans
can possess racial prejudice yet maintain a self-conception as unprejudiced).
This is one of several circumstances where a deliberative actor might have an incentive not just to
defend themselves from charges of discrimination, but defend others like them as well. See Susan
Condor, Lia Figgou, Jackie Abell, Stephen Gibson & Clifford Stevenson, ‘They’re Not Racist . . .’
Prejudice Denial, Mitigation and Suppression in Dialogue, 45 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 442–43 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Teun A. van Dijk, Discourse and the Denial of Racism, 3
DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 87, 89 (1992)) (noting that “social actors may, on occasion, attempt to deny
prejudice on behalf of groups to which they belong” because they “resent being perceived as
racists,” both as individuals and members of society).
See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff carries the burden of proving discriminatory intent,238 but it is the
defendant who is in an epistemically privileged position regarding that
critical fact. Just as there is a healthy presumption of deference to our
hypothetical Jane regarding her own articulation of her emotional state, so
too is it understandable for judges to presume at the outset that a person
alleged to have engaged in discrimination has more reliable access to their
own state of mind than does the person making the allegation.239 Yet
discrimination case plaintiffs must virtually always convince judges of the
opposite—that their second-hand assessment of the mindset of the defendant
is more reliable than a first-hand declaration. Absent cases where the
plaintiff is fortuitous enough to have direct indications of discriminatory
animus, it is far from clear what sort of evidence could definitively show that
the defendant thought something he or she denies thinking.240 And so again,
the intentionalist requirement of discrimination may predispose judges to
believe that discrimination claims simply do not “ring true.”241
These problems, of course, track with more general criticisms of the
intentionalist model.242 That said, the concern being articulated here rests
not on the substance of intentionalist theories of discrimination, but the
discourse-suppressing practices they enable. There might also be substantive
problems with intentionalist models, but the danger this Section is focusing
on is that, through dismissal, they enable us to avoid reasoned consideration
of other conceptions of discrimination. An intentionalist theory of
discrimination need not suppress debate over competing theories if it is
adopted as a starting position and its adherents recognize that it must be
238

239

240

241
242

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citation omitted) (“The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the
plaintiff.”); see also Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2189 (1996) (citations omitted) (citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979)) (commenting that plaintiffs must show “a state of mind akin to malice” in order to prove
discriminatory intent).
As Robert Bone put it, one reason that discrimination cases suffer under Iqbal is that “mental states
are notoriously hard to prove.” Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment
on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 877 (2010).
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 534 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that in
cases where the plaintiffs lacks “the good luck to have direct evidence of discriminatory intent”
there lies “the practical question of how the plaintiff without such direct evidence can meet” their
burden of proof).
See Leading Cases, supra note 39, at 262.
See Oppenheimer, supra note 219, at 916 (“If whites are frequently unaware of their own racism, a
theory of employment discrimination that focuses on an intent to discriminate provides no remedy
for most discrimination.”); Freeman, supra note 20, at 1054–55 (arguing that the focus on identifying
a discrete perpetrator harboring discriminatory animus is predicated on a need to declare most
actors “innocent[]” and thus not liable for bearing the burden of rectifying allegedly discriminatory
conduct).
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defended when challenged.243 That commitment (to defend the theory
against challengers) would preclude this type of dismissal of discrimination
claims because the subject would have to recognize the possibility that the
claim is being made on an alternative set of assumptions. The ensuing
conversation would interrogate the competing assumptions—and it may,
ultimately, affirm the superiority of the intentionalist model.244 But opening
the theory up to such challenge would deprive it of much dissonancereduction utility. And the fact that those who believe in an intentionalist
theory of discrimination rarely, in practice, seem willing to subject it to this
sort of meta-debate suggests that it is the theory’s ability to suppress debate,
rather than any substantive theoretical coherency, that provides the root of
its appeal.
V. BYPASSING DISMISSAL: LAW AS A COGNITIVE EXPRESSWAY
Law is but one of many channels through which a given social
controversy might be argued.245 While the preceding analysis has certainly
engaged in specifically legal questions, it has also cast its net more widely to
consider other vectors of social discourse where dismissal circumvents or
obstructs important public debates. But law is not just another forum for
civil discourse. It has certain specific characteristics which suggest it occupies
a crucial niche in the deliberative ecosystem. This final Part accordingly
offers a comparative institutionalist account of how dismissal operates in legal
versus non-legal arenas. Certain features of the legal system make it uniquely
well-positioned to overcome the problem of dismissal—at least some of the
time—and push important public conversations forward.
This may seem counterintuitive. In many circumstances, after all, legal
institutions seem to amplify the problems of dismissal. Whereas in private
243

244

245

See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO
EPISTEMOLOGY 25 (2001) (discussing Robert Brandom’s theory of “default” entitlements which
form the basis for epistemic justification, but which we adopt with the proviso that they will be
defended if challenged) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kristina Rolin, The Bias Paradox in
Feminist Standpoint Epistemology, 3 EPISTEME 125, 129 (2006) (“[D]efault assumptions are adopted
with a commitment to defend them when they are challenged with contrary evidence or other
arguments.”).
See Ben Kotzee, Poisoning the Well and Epistemic Privilege, 24 ARGUMENTATION 265, 276–79 (2010)
(arguing that a claim of epistemic privilege is not inherently invalid so long as the claimant admits
the legitimacy of, and is willing to partake in, a meta-debate regarding the validity of that claim).
See generally Catherine R. Albiston, Lauren B. Edelman & Joy Milligan, The Dispute Tree and the Legal
Forest, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 105, 106–09 (2014) (noting that dispute resolution is not a
pyramid where initial claims are progressively winnowed down until a rump remainder receive
legal adjudication, but rather a tree whereby different disputes take different paths towards
resolution).
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conversation we are free to explore any thoughts or claims which catch our
fancy, legal concepts must be sufficiently clear such that citizens have
considerable advance warning regarding what sorts of behaviors are
permissible or not, and must have a broad enough base of popular support
to be enacted into positive law. Consequently, law by necessity will often
exclude many types of claims which do not fit inside preexisting doctrinal
boxes. This is what Robert Cover famously referred to as law’s “jurispathic”
quality.246 Law can only accommodate a small sliver of the potential
understandings which might animate a given conception of rights, justice, or
the good. Bound by the need for order and predictability, it must “kill” other
potential sources of legal understanding.247 The (civil procedure) tool of
dismissal in many ways operates to screen out those claims which—whatever
their merits as an abstract notion of justice—do not fall inside the relatively
narrow borders of accepted legal doctrine.
Yet there is a less-remarked-upon, but equally important, advantage that
law provides. Law offers a unique opportunity to circumvent the problem of
dismissal because—for those claims which do fit inside the proper
templates—courts must generally hear the cases presented to them. While
pundits, politicians, or everyday people are free to consider any claims they
like, they are rarely obligated to do so. The unabridged freedom of the
private sphere which allows any claim to be heard also allows any claim to
be ignored. If a person responds to an uncomfortable assertion by dismissing
it out of hand, there is rarely anything their interlocutor can do to force the
issue.
What law provides against dismissal is a demarcated path through which
certain claims, framed within preset and (relatively) stable borders, are
entitled to be heard. When Robert Bolt described law as “a causeway upon
which, so long as he keeps to it, a citizen may walk safely,”248 this is not what
he meant—but the metaphor resonates. Law may not recognize certain
forms of discrimination and people may find discrimination claims distasteful
generally, but an employment discrimination claim that dutifully follows the
borders of McDonnell-Douglas will at the very least make it to summary
judgment.249 As a consequence, law can offer an expressway past the first

246
247
248
249

Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983).
Id. at 53.
Robert Bolt, A Man For All Seasons 92 (Heinemann ed., 1960).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973) (articulating the “prima facie
case” that must be made demonstrating employment discrimination, with the employer then
obliged “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its decision and the plaintiff
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two cognitive checkpoints. Unlike everyday conversation, a legal claim that
adheres to certain preset conventions generally has to be heard—a court cannot
shunt it aside simply because it is inconvenient or uncomfortable.
The ability to even present an issue as one worthy of debate matters.250
And just as the inability to articulate a given claim in legal language can
render it infirm even outside the courtroom, the fact that a claim has legal
resonance comes with legitimizing force. When Catherine MacKinnon
identified the importance of law recognizing the concept of sexual
harassment, she did not focus on the tangible remedies that might result from
a winning suit. What was more important was that women “have been given
a forum, legitimacy to speak, authority to make claims”—only after this
litany did she conclude with “and an avenue for possible relief.”251 An
important element of oppression is often its denial that the disenfranchised
group even has the right to present claims.252 A judicial forum can be a rare
arena where those claims must be given at least the trappings of reasoned
analysis.
Arguments favoring an enhanced judicial role in the protection of
minority groups typically focus on how judges are relatively insulated from
popular pressure and prejudices which promote discriminatory legislation.253
This position immediately runs into trouble, as it is by no means clear that
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251
252

253

then required to point to evidence challenging that rationale as a pretext for discrimination). But
see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709 (2007) (citation omitted) (suggesting that judicial “dislike of or
discomfort with certain claims—whether employment discrimination, sexual harassment, or Family
Medical Leave Act cases,” has prompted judges to be disproportionately willing to dispense of such
cases at the summary judgment stage).
See IRIS MARION YOUNG, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in INTERSECTING
VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, AND POLICY 60, 71 (1997) (“In a
discussion situation in which different people with different aims, values, and interests seek to solve
collective problems justly, it is not enough to make assertions and give reasons. One must also be
heard.”); ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 109 (1989) (arguing that the principle of
effective democratic participation includes giving each citizen “adequate and equal opportunities
for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather
than another”).
CATHERINE MACKINNON, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 104 (1987) (emphasis added).
Cf. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1857) (concluding that descendants of enslaved
Africans, even if they are acknowledged as citizens of a state, nonetheless would not be citizens of
the United States and therefore would not be “entitled to sue as such in one of its courts”); HANNAH
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (1994) (“The fundamental deprivation of
human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes
opinions significant and actions effective.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (promoting heightened
judicial scrutiny in circumstances where laws target “discrete and insular minorities” burdened by
prejudice in the political system).
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courts are systematically more likely to be sympathetic to the interests of
dispossessed groups than are the democratic branches.254 There is, after all,
something a bit odd about responding to the problem of minority
dispossession by delegating the issue to a body that is whiter, maler,
straighter, richer, and older than the American electorate writ large.
Moreover, there is a more general paradox identified above: if judges are
unlikely to differ significantly from popular conceptions of key political issues,
how can they possess any significant advantage as reformers vis-à-vis
democratic or social actors?
The focus on dismissal identifies a specific institutional advantage of
judges that cuts through this Gordian Knot.255 It is plausible—indeed it
seems likely—that two otherwise similarly situated deliberators will reach
differing conclusions over a contentious issue if one is forced to provide
reasons for their position and another is not. Judges do not necessarily reason
differently than everyday people, but they are forced to reason more often,
particularly in politically or emotionally fraught situations. Judges may be
most likely to give due accord to marginalized voices, not because they are
especially moral, wise, or insulated from democratic pressures, but simply
because the norms of their position often force them to engage in an
argument where others do not have to.
Consider the rapid evolution of Americans’ views on same-sex
marriage.256 For many years, the prospect of gay marriage could be
dismissed as radical, extreme, a non-starter, ludicrous—all responses that do
not require any serious engagement of the issue on its merits. But courts are
limited in their ability to resort to those sorts of responses. Nominally, a court
cannot dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it is “a non-starter.” They
need to provide logically and legally cognizable reasons. Now to be sure, the
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255
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See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1404–05 (2006)
(noting how the “argument for judicial review depends on a particular assumption about the
distribution of support for the minority’s rights. The sympathy is assumed to be strongest among
political elites.”); Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of
Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1148–49 (2006) (criticizing as “empirically
questionable” the notion that “judges remain better suited to decide matters of principle due to
their comparative institutional competences” supposedly stemming from their “political
insulation”); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 783 (2001) (“Inasmuch as judging is choice, the conclusions drawn from
psychological research on human judgment and choice likely apply to judges as well.” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
See supra Part I.A.
See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (May 14, 2019), http://www.pewforum.org/
fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ (documenting a thirty-point swing in favor of gay
marriage between 2004 and 2019).
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evaluative aspect of motivated cognition gives judges plenty of opportunities
to turn aside novel or unpopular claims even while purporting to deal with
them on their merits.257 And losing “on the merits” can come with significant
dignitary harms too, particularly where the proffered reasons are themselves
biased or demeaning towards the claimant.258 Getting past the first two
cognitive checkpoints clearly is not everything. But it is not nothing either.
Being in the realm where one’s opponents have to provide reasons against
your claim is, for many groups, a significant and meaningful advance.
And just as a dismissed or avoided claim can leaded to a “spiral of silence”
further marginalizing its proponents,259 where law successfully places an issue
on social radar screens it can have a cascading effect on public attitudes.
Once gay marriage broke through with legal victories260 it became
correspondingly more difficult in public discussion to simply dismiss the
concept outright. The early judicial decisions affirming gay marriage did not
end the debate, but they did signal that a debate must be had.261 And being
in the realm of substantive debate is a much better place for gay marriage
advocates to be than they were when the issue could be tossed aside as one
of fringe radicals. Meanwhile, as people start to rethink the issue (or really,
think critically about it for the first time), they can reason from and rely on
the signals provided by the instigating legal decisions.262
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Not to mention the obvious point that, sometimes, marginalized groups nonetheless simply are
wrong on the merits of their claims. See Waldron, supra note 254, at 1398 (“People—including
members of topical minorities—do not necessarily have the rights they think they have. They may
be wrong about the rights they have; the majority may be right.”).
See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN
LAW 92–93 (1990) (describing the negative effects of bringing a discrimination claim that “define
some people as different, and inferior, in light of the norm” (citation omitted)).
See Noelle-Neumann, supra note 76; see also supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding a law that prohibited same-sex
marriage per se unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (“We declare that barring
an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”).
See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 861, 871
(2006) (“[I]t may one day be said that Baehr and Goodridge started a process that culminated in samesex couples securing widespread relationship protections, whether through marriage or civil
union.”).
See David Schraub, The Perils and Promise of the Holder Memo, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 187,
201 (2012) (“[H]igh-profile legal discussions, particularly when instigated by known political actors
who can serve as effective opinion leaders, become part of the larger cocktail of considerations
voters use to assess a given social question.”).
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Even claims which lose in the courts can have a salutary effect in
promoting important social conversations.263 Sometimes legal decisions
spark public conversations leading to formal amendments to the relevant
legal regimes. The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire,
limiting the timeframe for workers to bring suit over discriminatory pay, was
met with great public outrage and a swift statutory reversal.264 But even
where it results in no legal modifications, a losing claim can nonetheless have
important social ramifications. When the Iowa Supreme Court held in 2013
that a male employer’s decision to fire a female subordinate for being too
sexually attractive was not illegal sex discrimination,265 much of the public
outrage did not take the form of technical quibbles with the Court’s legal
analysis but rather with the harmful nature of such a rule as a broader moral
principle.266 The writers of these critiques seemed to view the decision of the
court as the definitive, socially sanctioned answer to the question “is firing a
woman because she is supposedly too ‘desirable’ to her male supervisor
justifiable as a matter of gender equality,” and if they were right then the
263

264

265

266

See NeJaime, supra note 17, at 954 (citations omitted) (noting that, even among scholars who believe
that Brown failed to directly make a significant dent in segregation, some nonetheless credit it for
“fueling a powerful social movement by raising consciousness, driving fundraising, legitimizing a
cause, and influencing other state actors”); Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover,
96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1867 (1987) (noting the importance of “even those claims that lose, or have lost
in the past, if they continue to represent claims that muster people’s hopes and articulate their
continuing efforts to persuade”).
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628–29 (2007) (requiring that a plaintiff
with a sex discrimination claim file an EEOC complaint within 180 days of the alleged violation
because “current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination”), abrogated
by Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, 6 (2009) (recognizing that
an “unlawful employment practice occurs . . . when an individual is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice” (emphasis added)).
Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013) (holding that terminating a female
employee because of her appearance, while unfair, does not amount to illegal gender
discrimination).
See, e.g., Jessica Valenti, Asking for It, NATION (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/asking-it
(“When this dentist in Iowa can fire his assistant for turning him on—even though she’s done
absolutely nothing wrong—the message again is that it’s men’s ability to work that’s important.”);
Doug Barry, Iowa Supreme Court Says It Was Totally Cool for a Dentist To Fire His ‘Irresistibly Attractive’
Female Employee, JEZEBEL (Dec. 22, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/iowa-supreme-court-saysit-was-totally-cool-for-a-denti-5970736 (criticizing the paradoxical nature of the Knight decision’s
failure to recognize gender discrimination in the face of purportedly straightforward evidence to
the contrary).
Of course, this is not to say that there is not space to argue that the decision was legally wrong, or
that the decision was legally correct and that the law should be changed. But the point is that the
decision was taken by many to entail not just the court’s legal judgment on the meaning of the
relevant anti-discrimination statutes, but also a considered moral judgment on gender relations that
was taken to be normatively dangerous. But see Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 73 (stating that the relevant
question was not whether “a jury could find that Dr. Knight treated Nelson badly,” but rather
whether the alleged facts constituted unlawful discrimination).
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decision is depressing indeed.267 But the public reaction to the decision—
largely critical and incredulous—is at least as important as the formal legal
outcome. The legal proceedings placed this sort of behavior in public
conversation, and the general consensus that emerged seemed to be that such
an action is wrong. Identifying and articulating that consensus has value
regardless of the formal legal disposition of the case. Thirty, forty, fifty years
ago, it is unlikely that behavior like this would have ever even made it onto
the social radar screen. Courts provided a vector for that social conversation
to happen, and the results outside the courtroom were overwhelmingly
positive.
CONCLUSION
Everyone comes to the table with certain value commitments; everyone
comes to the table seeking to suppress certain thoughts they would rather not
think. In its most explored facet, motivated cognition deals with a very
specific instantiation of this instinct: biased appraisals of received evidence.
But often times, this is not the most common or most effective defensive
strategy. We can construct our social world to avoid hearing certain types of
claims. And, more dangerously, we can create conditions where we feel
justified in dismissing certain claims—refusing to even consider them
substantively on their merits. When abused, dismissal breaches our duty to
listen to our fellows and does not respect members of marginalized
communities as epistemic agents.
As institutions, law and the courts sit in an interesting position vis-à-vis
dismissal. On the one hand, law is limited in its ability to address novel claims
because law is by design a limited instrument. A significant purpose of law
is precisely to winnow down the theoretically infinite array of claims a litigant
might make into a much narrower and more manageable set that are known
in advance. Yet within those boundaries, law also offers significant
opportunities. If a claim can be framed within the four corners of a
recognized legal doctrine, courts are uniquely situated in public dialogue
because they cannot simply refuse to listen. They cannot “dismiss” a claim
simply because it is discomfiting or disconcerting, politically unpopular or a
“non-starter.” They have to give reasons. And while that is not the end of
the game, it is for many groups and many claims the beginning of broader
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See, e.g., Valenti, supra note 266; Joseph Diebold, Iowa Supreme Court: It’s Okay To Fire A Woman For
Being Too Attractive, THINKPROGRESS (July 12, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/iowa-supremecourt-its-ok-to-fire-a-woman-for-being-too-attractive-d022b15121e7/.
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social conversation that otherwise might have been avoided or dismissed
outright.
The linkage between legal and discursive dismissal is more than just a
comparative exercise, however. Legal scholarship frequently asks what other
disciplines—economics, psychology, philosophy—have to teach us about
law. This Article suggests that law has something to teach us about the ethics
of our everyday discursive interactions. Deeply embedded in legal culture
are a series of important deliberative norms that make fair argument and
adjudication possible. These include the right of all sides to present
arguments, the importance of fairly weighing evidence, and the obligation to
take seriously even uncomfortable claims. In a political climate where many
Americans worry that we are becoming epistemically siloed—stuck in likeminded bubbles, unwilling or unable to even contemplate arguments from
communities foreign to our own—these virtues often feel in short supply.
The focus on dismissal—the legal concept analyzed as a discursive practice—
can help point the way to more expansive and more just modes of interacting
across political and cultural difference. In this way, legal thinking is valuable
not simply as a means of securing formal rights and remedies at the end of a
filed case. The lessons of the law can also inform our everyday deliberative
practices, pushing us to be less close-minded, less arrogant, less partisan—
less dismissive—towards the ordinary hard thoughts that a functioning
democratic citizen must force herself to think.
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